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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Even an investigation confined, in so far as it is at all possi- 
ble, to the narrative of events taking place within the Congo's own 
borders, would encompass a labyrinth of paths and movements.    Amidst 
the turmoil and confusion attributable to tribalism, to the many phases 
of Congolese and United Nations action within the Congo, and to the false 
dawns especially with relation to Tshombe and the reentry of Katanga 
into the Central Government,  even the most avid student of the Congo 
crisis is at first belabored not to fall into an abyss of confusion 
while trying both to follow and to see in relation to one another the 
many and tortuous paths of action taken by the various elements and 
their leaders. 
However,  even though the events of the Congo may provide in them- 
selves a maze of entanglements, any attempt to examine them separate 
from thtir international drama would be pure artifice, appropriate for 
no more than laying a foundation of reference.    Even from the first as 
indicated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution of July Ik, 
I960,  it was agreed that the situation in the Congo was a danger to 
international peace and security.    Moreover,  it has been not only the 
world-wide effects of what has happened in the  Congo that has made such 
events of international concern, but it has also been the degree of inter- 
national intervention related to the causing of these events.    In short, 
the Congo has been a theater of an international drama, and as such the 
events which are so frequently referred to as the Congo crisis have 
been not just a crisis for the Congo and the Congolese people but a 
crisis for Africa, for the Cold War powers, and for the United Nations 
itself. 
Whether looking at the Congo crisis as a crisis to the Congo,  the 
African nations,   the Cold War,  or the United Nations, we do so with the 
view expressed so well by E. M. Millet" in his comparison of the "effect" 
of a crisis to that of a "flash of lightning": 
It not only casts a sharp light on the scene 5 it illuminates 
as well a wide expanse of the surrounding area and,  in its 
glare, many once-hidden features of the landscape may be seen 
clearly for the first time.l 
Although Mr.  Miller makes this statement solely in relation to the effects 
of the Congo crisis on the United Nations, bringing to light "both pit- 
falls and potentialities" which had not previously been conspicuous, 
yet it can be meaningfully and fruitfully applied to the other designated 
world forces to which the events in the Congo have proved a crisis.    As 
I hope this essay may in its own way relate,  the Congo crisis—as one 
instance of national and international policies in action—also throws 
light on    many    of    the past, present, and future areas of world concern, 
and national reactions to them. 
The Congo crisis has at all times had at least two main theaters 
of action:     the Congo (Leopoldville)  and New York.    As nations assumed 
their various roles their actions in the two theaters have not always 
coincided nor have they in some cases even seemed to be a part of the 
same policy.    Similarly the words of nations have not always been in 
IE. M. Miller,  "Legal Aspects of the United Nations in the Congo", 
The American Journal of International Law, LV (Spring, 1961),  28. 
accordance with their activities.    Thus,  there is often confusion 
about the real nature of a nation's policy:     Is it according to what 
it says or what it does?    Is it in accordance with its action in 
New York or in the Congo? 
Nations themselves are made up of individuals,   individuals whose 
views and interests differ and who,  at least in Western democracies, 
have much freedom to act as they themselves desire as well as to influ- 
ence those in their government.     Thus, it is no wonder that there ap- 
pears to be internal division and that the actions of a nation and of 
its nationals do not always seem of one accord. 
Even with world communication such that we can be aware of the 
many aspects and fluctuations of the policies and activities of nations 
according to time and place, yet this more complete awareness does 
little to remove the different interpretations given to a nation's 
course of action.     Newspapers, magazines,  and even books,  the authors 
of which usually have accessible to them the same basic information, 
although perhaps from different sources, nevertheless can render almost 
completely different interpretations according to where they place 
their emphasis and what points they highlight.    And,  the fact is.  that 
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few sources can be dismissed as having no basis of truth.     For in- 
stance,   British policy and action as seen and portrayed by Arthur Burns 
in the book Peace-Keeping by U.N.   Forces:     From Suez to the Congo and 
by Conor Cruise O'Brien in his To Katanga and Back would hardly be 
identified by a reader as being of the same substance.    Within both 
books 3ritish policy in the Katanga situation is dealt with,  yet when 
one arises from reading O'Brien's version, he is condemning the British 
for their inaction and their subtle encouragement which though usually 
indirect was nevertheless that which at acute moments was responsible 
for Tshombe's holding out for Katanga's separation, and thus, making 
things much more difficult and expensive in lives and money for the 
UN.2    However, after reading what Burns has to say, one has quite a 
different impression of the British and their policy with regard to 
Katanga and UN actions.    Rather than being left with the feeling that 
perhaps the British were greatly responsible for the UN's ineffective- 
ness and even guilty of using devious means, one is instead impressed 
with the maturity and wisdom shown in the British policy such as re- 
flected in its concern for precedents being set by the UN's use of 
force, while other younger and less experienced nations were mere pre- 
occupied with UN effectiveness in this one situation.    Not only do 
both authors present their respective views quite effectively,   they 
also have something of value to say, which cannot be discounted as in 
O'Brien's  case by saying his is just an Irishman's prejudice.    The 
issues in the Congo crisis are many and the actions and motives of a 
nation are complex and not always of one mind.    Such issues as the 
setting of precedents for the use of force by a peace-keeping organ- 
ization or for internal intervention are greatly debatable and will 
come up again and again and not just in context with British policy. 
From the very beginning of the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo,  the events which have taken place and the UN resolutions that 
have been passed have held various meanings to the various parties 
involved,  depending on from where one was viewing the situation.    In 
the July lu Security Council Resolution the situation in the Congo 
2Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New Torki    Simon 
and Schuster, Inc., 1962), p. 30U et passim." 
v/as deemed a danger to "international peace and security." Yet what 
constituted this danger was not the same to all nations and peoples: 
To some, it was solely the intervention of the colonist "aggressor " 
(Belgium); to others it was not so much the Belgians who were to be 
feared, but the possibility of there being Communist intervention to 
exploit the situation and fill the vacuum; and still to others it 
was very much the Belgians but also the probability that the Congo 
would become an area subject to Eastern and Western intervention, 
and thus, become caught up in the throes of the Cold War. 
Nations from Western Europe which were colonial powers tended 
to emphasize in their interpretation and speeches the internal 
turmoil within the Congo as being the real cause of the danger. 
However, to Russia and her satellites it was solely the Belgian 
"aggressor," later to be broadened to the NATO "imperialists." The 
Soviet Union paid little attention to the lack of law and order in 
the Congo, although it was the reason purported by Belgium as making 
necessary its intervention so as to protect its nationals. To the 
Africans, it was both the Belgian intervention and continued 
presence—although most of them did not support the Soviet Union 
all the way in its attempt to get Belgium denounced in the UN as 
an "aggressor"—and the threat of the Congo becoming an area of 
East and West competition that made the situation so dangerous. 
The speeches of the African delegates to the United Nations did not 
dwell upon the incapability of the Congolese themselves to maintain 
law and order. To the United States, Belgian intervention and the 
lack of law and order in the Congo of course constituted a great 
danger; however, these facts were largely seen in light of the greater 
danger of Communist intervention and exploitation of the Congo 
situation,   bringing the Cold War struggle to the Congo and to 
Africa. 
It is perhaps only natural for the nations  to evaluate the 
Congo situation in terms of their own experience and from the 
viewpoint of their own situation in it.    Yet one can see where 
there could not help but be much controversy and confusion about 
the implementation of resolutions that from the first were often 
only a vague common denominator of the different national views, 
and which,  thereafter, were interpreted by each nation according 
to its own views.    And with time, the situation in the Congo became 
even more complex and more highly explosive, and thus, the carrying 
out of resolutions became subject to more and more controversy. 
In the Congo crisis, as had been the case in other crises in 
which the UN attempted to exercise its preventive diplomacy,   the 
UN rushed in, according to the Secretary-General, with one of its 
reasons being to fill the existing power vacuum before it became 
enveloped in the Cold War struggle.    However as  can be seen, the 
UN itself has not escaped the taint of the Cold War,   but has in 
fact too often been used,  or at least attempted to be used, by 
or for the purposes of the opposing blocs.     Conor Cruise O'Brien 
has paraphrased Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian serving as the Secretary- 
General's Special Representative in the Congo, as saying:     "Every 
great power .   .   . wished to turn the United Nations into an instru- 
ment of its own policy, but some powers were in a better position 
than others  to do so."3    The implications of this statement 
3Ibid„ p. 63. 
especially with regard to the Western nations' actions and policies 
are worthy of investigation.    It is not that the Soviet Union did 
not try as hard as the Western powers to use the United Nations to 
further its own policy.    This could in no way be said while looking 
at its  tremendous activity in New York both directly in relation to 
the UN's Congo policy and in areas fundamental not just to its 
operation in the Congo but to all United Nations actions.     Yet 
conditions are such that some powers have had more success in their 
efforts than others.    Thus, there may be some inkling of truth in 
the Soviet Union's claim, made over and over again in' the General 
Assembly in defense of its own criticized activities,   that what it 
has been called to account for doing outside of the UN umbrella 
has been done by other powers shielded by the UN cloak. 
Not only has the United States at times been denounced by 
Russia and its satellites as attempting to make the United Nations 
an instrument of its policies, but there has even been some quite 
candid statements written by our own countrymen and by those of 
Western Europe in regard to the excessive influence of the United 
States in the United Nations.    Even though there was a noticeable 
change in United States policy and action in the United Nations 
with regard to the Congo crisis occurring when the new administration 
reconsidered many of United States policies in light of the ever- 
changing African and world situation,  nevertheless, the charges and 
inferences made against the United States for use of the UN have 
not terminated.    United States policies have changed with the new 
administration—and changed in such a way, I think, that they take 
into account more realities and needs of the world-yet there is 
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accusation that once these policies are composed or adopted as 
U.S. policies,   they continue to be pushed through.    The specifics 
of such accusation such as U.S. pushing the seating of the Kasavubu 
delegation in the UN General Assembly,   the U.S. relationship to 
Kasavubu and Mobutu elements in the Congo and its opposition to 
Lumumba need to be examined.    Similarly the wisdom of such a policy 
deserves discussion.    There are those in the United States who view 
the value of the United Nations only in so much as it can be used 
as an arm of the State Department, an arm which is less expensive 
for the U.S. to operate and less likely to backfire because of 
anti-imperialist sentiment.    However,   there are others who see the 
United Nations if maintained in so far as possible as an impartial 
world force—the instrument of no single nation or group of nations— 
as having present value and future potentialities far beyond that of 
our State Department, and as being to our world in its present divided 
state a necessity for survival.    Thus,  not only may excessive 
U.S. influence in pushing a particular policy,  action,  or leader 
be unwise in a specific UN operation, but in the long run the 
effects of such influence may be detrimental to the organization, 
the world as a whole, and even to the best interests of th United 
States itself. 
One could never really say that the United Nations Operation 
was successful in keeping out the Cold War when, as we can see, 
Russia and the United States in their own ways played their 
respective roles and often were too ready to play an even greater 
one in the Congo.    Yet, by its filling the existing vacuum and its 
continual efforts to prevent unilateral interference,   the UN did 
prevent another Korea  or Viet Nam,   or another Spanish Civil in the 
Congo.    It was not only at the beginning of the UN operation in the 
Congo that the danger of the Cold V/ar involvement was great and 
immediate; this factor weighed heavily for more than two years. 
However,  international sympathies and support were too complex just 
to be divided along Cold V/ar lines.    The Cold War was very much 
involved,   as the division and struggle  between East and V/est is very 
much a reality of our present world, yet there are other realities. 
Although perhaps a little exaggerated,   tho  following statement conveys 
the general nature of the significance of the Congo to the many nations 
and the fact that their interests in it were by no means always 
determined by Cold V/ar factors: 
Never before has a single territory been the object of such 
unanimous covetousness.    Everyone  is hoping—and preparing— 
to get something out of it.    The Vatican and Britain, Russia 
and the U.S., Tunisia and Israel,  China and Yugoslavia, 
Guinea and Ghana—all have some kind of stake in the Congo's 
future,  to say nothing of South Africa, the Rhodesias and - 
the Portuguese colonies, whose own future may well be 
settled by what goes on in Leopoldville and Katanga.* 
The actions of Belgium, Britain, and France cannot always be 
explained along Cold V/ar lines and even less frequently can their 
actions be understood by looking solely at Cold V/ar factors.    These 
nations are in the Western bloc, but their past experience, 
and thus, what they wee as the present realities for them, include 
many other factors, basic of which is their experience as colonial 
powers.    Similarly, whether looking at the  actions of South Africa, 
the Rhodesias, and the Portuguese colonies or at those of the 
states of North and V/est Africa, one's   understanding of their 
kJeanDaniel,  "The Drama of Katanga,"  New Statesman. LX 
(August 13, I960),  205. 
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motivating concerns would be greatly confined if they were only 
seen in terms of the Cold War. 
I am suggesting that Americans are in great danger of being 
trapped into seeing everything in Cold War terms since that is what 
seems uppermost in our minds and most real in our experience.    There 
is the danger of our being victims of our own habitual thought 
patterns,  and thus, blind to fundamental realities of large parts 
of the world,   or at least regarding as secondary those things which 
are in fact primary in world conditions.    I agree that there may have 
been at least some movement away from this confinement among American 
foreign policy decision-makers in the past three or so years,  however, 
so far this seems  to be only a movement among the few and just a be- 
ginning in an area where there is far to go.    Too often those who have 
wanted and needed to make Americans sit up and listen, have had to 
talk in Bold War terms citing the Communist infiltration and using the 
Communist label. 
There are concerns of the world, as one can so easily see when 
looking from an African viewpoint,   that are real whether or not there 
is a Cold War.    There are those who speak of the division of the world 
not just as between East and West but as between the North and South, 
the division between the "developed" and the "underdeveloped",  the 
rich and the poor,  and the white and the colored.    And problems to 
the African nations such as neo-colonialism, secession, balkanization, 
economic viability, and racial equality are fundamental not only to 
them, and not only to us as seen through the Cold War threat, but to 
us as part of a world in which no longer can any nation's well being 
and prosperity be preserved apart from the whole. 
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There has been some question as to what extent Americans would 
be concerned with the welfare of the peoples of the world if it were 
not for the Cold War with its constant reminder of the threat of 
Communist take-over of the world.    How much interest would we show 
and how much would we give of ourselves and our prosperity to aid in 
the solving of these problems which are so very real to the Africans 
and many other parts of the world?    How many of us would really pledge 
ourselves and uphold such a pledge as that of the late President Kennedy 
made by him in his inaugural address: 
To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe 
struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our 
best efforts to help them help themselves for whatever period 
is required—not because  the Communist may be doing it, not 
because we seek their votes, but because it is right.-5 
Although a consideration of the Congo crisis involves one in an 
international drama that illuminates certain policies and actions of 
nations and the ways in which they perceive world problems, yet in 
regard to the UN itself such a consideration throws one right in the 
midst of what has been probably the greatest challenge to the Organi- 
zation.    This challenge "has tested the assumptions which had been 
made—by scholars as well as by the late Secretary-General—about the 
role of the UN, its possibilities and its limits, and about the rela- 
tions between its principal organs and its main groups of members. ..6 
Dap; Hammarskjold in his dynamic interpretation of the office had hither- 
to shown the importance of the Secretary-General to the effectiveness 
of the UN's peace-keeping activities.    However,   in the United Nations 
^President Kennedy's Inaugural Address,  cited by Arnold Rivkin, 
"Principal Elements of U.S. Policy toward Under-developed Countries,", 
. International Affairs, XXXVII {October*-i;6l), U53. 
6Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread:    The UN in the Congo 
Labyrinth," International Organization, Spring,  1962, p. 331. 
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Operation in the Congo the importance of the Secretary-General's 
ability to carry on an operation while the Security Council was dead- 
locked, was made evident as never before.    Yet it was during this same 
crisis that the very nature of the office of the Secretary-General was 
challenged by the Russian "troika" principle.    The "troika," even more 
than the bankruptcy threat which had resulted from certain members 
refusal to pay their assessments for the peace-keeping operations, was 
a threat that would endanger all UN activities and would completely 
undermine the effectiveness of any peace-keeping force.    This is only 
one example of how the Congo crisis both alluwed for illumination of 
the Organization and gave the instance for its challenge. 
There has of late been much discussion about UN peace-keeping 
forces, even with regard to establishing a permanent force.    This inter- 
est does not seem out of place when looking at the world in which we 
live,  divided and yet one, with certain nations possessing nuclear 
destruction power over which tiere is no supranational authority.    Thus, 
the need for continued operations of preventive diplomacy to step between 
the two power blocs and the necessity of a force accompanying disarma- 
ment measures,  draw men to consideration of such a force.    And it is 
only natural that it be to the Congo operation, not only the most recent 
but by far the largest and most complex operation of the UN, to which 
they most readily turn to obtain data on practical difficulties and to 
use as a testing ground for the support of their own theoretical argu- 
ments.    The information that the Congo operation has made available in 
regard to the possibilities and difficulties of an international organi- 
zation's launching and maintaining a peace-keeping operation of such 
size and complexity as that in the Congo,  has been invaluable to 
researchers and to future operations. 
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The United Nations Operation in the Congo has revealed fundamental 
difficulties faced by a peace-keeping organization in carrying out 
such an operation.    Basic to these difficulties is that of being 
both effective in the mission it has undertaken and yet remaining 
impartial and in the character of a peace-keeping organization. 
Although it is often argued that "the United Nations is a mirror of 
the world around and that if the reflection is ugly the organization 
should not be blamed,"^ yet at the same time when the UN goes into 
action such as in the peace-keeping operation in the Congo, there 
are innumerable strings held upon its operation by the arguments 
that the United Nations is an organization for the maintenance 
of peace and as such must not act in such a way or use means which 
are contrary to the nature of its peace-keeping objective.    Thus, 
even though we admit in our more realistic moments that the UN can 
not help but reflect the realities of the world including the Cold 
War and the attempts by member states to further their national 
interests, yet in such an action as the Congo operation we seem to 
expect the UN to act as a filter purifying what goes in as national 
interests and Cold War maneuvers making them come out as impartial 
UN actions. 
The action taken by the UN in its operation in the Congo has 
received much criticism among the nations and the peoples of the 
world.    The Secretary-General has been criticized both for doing 
too much and for doing too little even with regard to the same 
action.    Some of this criticism is understandably due to national 
7Lincoln P. Bloomfield,  "New Diplomacy in the United Nations," 
The United States and the United Nations, ed. Francis 0. V/ilcox and 
H. Field Haviland, Jr.  (Baltimore, Maryland:    The John Hopkins Press, 
1961), p. 51. 
<U 
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interest, however, as one can see by examining the events and the 
arguments, some of the critical discussion cannot be explained away 
so easily. The operation in the Congo has exposed the United Nations 
to problems and difficulties that in the event of other peace- 
keeping operations, will have to be met once again. The United 
Nations Operation in the Congo has also set a variety of precedents 
from which the future peace-keeping missions will have to choose, 
and the choice of which will do much to determine what the United 
Nations will be to the world in its future. 
II.  THE CONGO LABYRINTH 
It has been said that "in the Congo, Atomic-age Man and Stone- 
age Man are contempcries."8    As we focus on the period since its 
independence on June 30,  i960, an awareness of this fact is basic 
to an understanding of what has happened in the Congo.    Tribal 
ways continue to exist right along side of modern, and sometimes 
events may magnify one without reflection of the other, but more 
often the influence of both tribalism and modernity may be seen. 
As Belgian control began to be loosened,  and especially after the 
breakdown of the national security forces,  tribal feuds against 
traditional rivals were revived and even though some of these men 
such as the Balubas had been the "white-collared" staff and mine- 
workers of the mining complex, many of them now reverted to the 
horrors and primitivism   of:  tribal warfare.9    However,  even much 
of the tribal violence may not be accurately looked upon as purely 
the natural offspring of the African tribal past.    Coner Cruise 
O'Brien,  from his position within Katanga as the Representative 
of the United Nations,  has made accusations that inter-tribal hatred 
and violence in Katanga were being provoked by the authorities there 
and used by them for their purposes. 1° 
Ritchie Calder, "Chaes in the Congo,"    New Statesman,  LX 
(December 10, i960), 927. 
9lbid. 
l°0»Brien,  pp.   2UO-U3. 
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In the Congo we see an ares of more than 900,000 square miles, 
a country of four times the size of France striving to make out 
of itself a nation shaped upon the modern form, however, having 
practically no national feelings and loyalties among its tribal and 
local partsj and unfortunately having little time in which these 
feelings might most likely develop as is possible during the period 
in which all are striving for a common purpose—for independence 
from a colonial power. Not only was the voting in the first elec- 
tions which were held in 19$7 for communal councils generally 
according to tribal loyalties but that of the elections just before 
independence also demonstrated their continued strength as opposed 
to national consciousness.** The length of time given for national 
movements to work before independence is actually granted is crucial 
to the development not only of national consciousness but to the 
ability to make a peaceful and orderly transition, a fact brought 
out so well by Melville Herskovits: 
Congo events stood out in stark contrast to the peaceful 
transition from colonial rule to independence that pre- 
vailed in West Africa highlighting the role of these 
nationalist movements in preparing African colonial peoples, 
psychologically no less than organizationally, for the 
changes to come, when the direction of their affairs would 
be in their own hands. The difference in the degree of 
orderliness in the transfer of power could be directly 
correlated with the extent to which nationalist movements 
has the time to organize, maneuver, and thus undergo a 
process of natural selection of political leaders. . . . 
In the Belgian Congo, however, nationalism had no oppor- 
tunity to serve the apprenticeship it served elsewhere. 
There was no time either to exert pressures on the colonial 
administration to place Africans in positions of respon- 
sibility, or to perfect an organization which could provide 
■^"The Congolese Vacuum," The Round Table, LI (Dedember, I960), 
Ul,U3. 
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experienced, responsible leadership for self-government, 
when it came.12 
In fact, in I960, the time cited for the Belgian Congo's indepen- 
dence the nominal national parties were actually still over- 
whelmingly tribal in feeling.    Nevertheless, Belgium granted the 
Belgian Congo independence on June 30—a little more than three years 
after the first sign of any independence movements—and thus, "the 
prod to unity—than is colonial rule—" was removed. 13 
TheSBWfQ. be no attempt, in the scope of this paper to evaluate  the 
policies of Belgium during its colonial rule nor to evaluate Belgium's 
intention and motives for granting the Congo's   independence so 
quickly.    Its purposes are not to place the blame on a particular 
group,  nor even to find out who deserves it, but rather to see the 
resulting factors as they exist in Congolese difficulties and poten- 
tials after June 30,   i960.    Belgian paternalism did have its effects; 
so did the more specific aspects of its policies,  its economic de- 
velopments,   its views and provisions for education,  and its failure 
to provide political experience for the Congolese so as  to allow for 
their understanding of the workings of Western democracy.^    The 
material benefits of Belgian policy of paternalism were numerous and 
its effects on the Congo's economy were climaxed by the costly capital 
developments under the Belgian Ten Year Plan during the decade of 
12Melville J. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa 
(New York:    Alfred A.  Knepf, 1962), p. 3U5. 
^Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa:    The Politics of Independence 
(New York:    Alfred A.  Knopf, Inc.,  1961), p. 87. 
^Alan P. Msrriam,  Congo:    Background of Conflict (Northwestern 
University:    Northwestern University Press, 1961), Chapter II, pp. 29-63. 
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1919-1959.    However, the unpreparedness of the Congolese to assume 
the responsibilities of independence in i960 was likewise the result 
of Belgian policy.    Belgium had viewed the creation of an educated 
elite as dangerous and had tried to keep the education of all more 
or less equal.    Thus, we find a solid and broad foundation of primary 
education,  but those among the Congolese with secondary education 
are much fewer, and those with post-secondary training are practically 
non-existent.     In accordance with this educational policy aimed at 
keeping all the Congolese at the same level, there were practically 
no Congolese with any experience in administration, whether in govern- 
ment or business, and none trained as doctors,  lawyers,  or engineers. 
Thus, when independence came so suddenly and the Belgians departed 
in such great numbers especially with the mutiny of the Force 
Publique  (national security forces),  there was little that could 
be done to prevent a breakdown of practically all administration 
and service.     In short, the situation in the Congo when the Belgians 
withdrew was as follows: 
The twenty-three political parties in the country, and the 
provincial governments,  represented tribal organizations 
and alliances rather than ideas.    There was no real nation- 
alism as we know it in other countries in Africa.    There 
were virtually no technicians left.    Nearly three-quarters 
of the Belgians had gone.    There were engine drivers but 
no maintenance men.    There were men,  for example, who knew 
how to put chemicals into water cleansing plants but had 
no idea at all why they did it.15 
Independence meant many things to many people.    In general the 
Congolese expectations of what independence would bring were char- 
acterized by such naivete that there could be no avoidance of great 
disappointment on its arrival.    Neither was the Force Publique 
^Patrick 0'Donovan, nThe Precedents of the Congo,11 International 
Affairs, XXXVII (April,  1961), 18U. 
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exempt from having such expectations, and when independence came 
and yet the Belgian officers remained, standing in the way of 
Congolese advancement, the men were frustrated especially as they 
saw their fellow Congolese advancing so suddenly to the highest 
positions of the government.«    Thus,  as other elements such as 
the workers in Coquilhatville rioted because their expectations had 
not been fulfilled,  so did the Force Publique express its frustration 
by its mutiny, a decisive factor in the developing chaos in the 
Congo.    Although the Belgians had begun to depart before independence, 
now with the mutiny of the Force Publique the situation became "self- 
fueling" : 
The Belgians were clearly on the run, more and more posts 
of responsibility were abandoned and could not be filled 
by the Congolese, businesses were closed and the ranks 
of the unemployed swelled enormously, and the government 
leaders were unable to  control the situation because they 
had no forces at their disposal to do ••,*• 
In the days following July 6, i960, when the mutiny of the Force 
Publique started,   the European population in a state of panic tried 
to escape by the thousands,   often only to find escape routes cut 
off, -  Lumumba and Kasavubu rushed from one place to another 
trying to reconcile the rebels with promises of pay raises and 
promotions,  disturbance and violence spread.    The situation was 
such that on July 10, Belgium intervened in Elizabethville and 
sent forces into various other parts of the Congo to protect its 
nationals. 
As a result of the "self-fueling" breakdown as described above, 
l6Merriam, pp. 83-87. 
17Ibid., p. 286. 
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there was a vacuum in the Congo that had to be filled, whether by 
the United States,  the Soviet Union, or the United Nations. A re- 
quest of the Congolese Government for troops to restore order was 
turned down by the United States, who referred them to the United 
Nations.    The Secretary-General received on July 12, a cable from 
Lumumba and Kasavubu requesting UN military assistance "to protect 
the national territory of the Congo, against the present external 
aggression which is a threat to international peace" and on July 13 
a second one saying that unless UN military forces were sent to 
the Congo immediately the Congo would have "to appeal to the Bandung 
Treaty Powers."1"    Thereupon the Secretary-General called a Security 
Council meeting which in the early hours of July lU adopted a reso- 
lution with a vote    of eight (Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador,  Italy, Poland, 
Tunisia, USSR, and U. S.) to nil,  with three abstentions  (China, France, 
and United Kingdom)  calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and 
authorizing the Secretary-General: 
To take the necessary steps,  in consultation with the 
Government of the Republic of the Congo,  to provide 
the Government with such military assistance as may 
be necessary, until,  through the efforts of the Con- 
golese Government with the technical assistance of 
the United Nations, the national security forces may 
be able in the opinion of the Government,  to meet 
fully their tasks.19 
With the passing of the July lU Security Council resolution 
and the immediate efforts of the Secretary-General to arrange for 
troops and the multitude of factors which are necessary for their 
transportation and maintenance, and his efforts to work out an 
l8United Nations,  (S/U382, July 12 & 13, I960) pp. 11-12. 
19United Nations,  (S/U387, July lU, I960), p. 16. 
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agreement with the Congo Government, the UN Operation in the Congo was 
launched.    The UN troops began arriving in the Congo on July 1$, the 
first of which were largely African.    As had previously been determined 
and referred to by the Secretary-General, the troops used in the Congo 
Operation, although not just from one region—Africa, would not include 
those of the permanent members of the Security Council.    Other basic 
principles derived largely from precedents set in the UN interventions 
in Suez, Lebanon, and Jordan which were referred to by the Secretary- 
General as being followed in the Congo Operation were!    The UN Force was 
under the exclusive command of the UN and would not become party to any 
internal conflict; it should have freedom of movement and the facilities 
necessary for its tasks;  and it should not take the initiative in the 
use of armed force but was entitled to respond in self defense.    These 
were some of the guidelines used by the Secretary-General in implement- 
ing the Security Council resolutions in regard to the Congo.    As terms 
of reference they did provide him with some sense of direction in inter- 
preting the mandates which were often so general and vague; however, as 
principles derived from situations very different in the respect that 
the UN had not in them been responsible for internal law and order, 
their application in the Congo Operation brought many difficulties for 
the UN forces in the field.    The attempt to adhere to the principles set 
up in previous UN experience prevented or delayed much action that was 
needed to halt the reign of confusion after the Central Government 'Urote down 
and action needed to deal effectively with the problem of Katanga. 
As we have seen even before the Security Council authorized 
20 
20Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by UN Forces; 
From Sue* to the Congo,(Sew York:    Fredrick A. Praeger, 1?63), pp. 2b", 
31-32. 
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military assistance to the Congo,   the  Congolese officials had related 
in a cable that it would be forced to appeal to the Bandung Treaty 
Powers if UN forces were not sent immediately.     The Congo Government 
wanted to get rid of the Belgian 'Aggressors," and if the UN would 
not or could not secure their removal either directly or indirectly, 
then it had the sympathies and soon had the assurances of help from 
Red Chinese Premier Chcu En-lai and Russian Premier Khrushchev.     Thus, 
from the beginning of its Congo operation the UN worked under the pres- 
sure of threats of unilateral intervention, threats which seemed to 
increase as Prime Minister Lumumba became disillusioned with the UN 
when it refused to become an extension of his own arm in bringing 
Katanga,  which had seceded on July 11, back into the Central Government. 
The UN was trying to get the withdrawal of Belgian troops as 
can he seen in the resolution of July 22 which calls not just for 
Belgium to withdraw its troops as did that of July lU,   but authorizes 
the Secretary-General "to take all necessary action to   this effect."21 
With the Belgium Government saying that their troops in the Congo would 
be withdrawn as UN troops were able to maintain law and order so as 
to protect its nationals,  the Secretary-General with his efforts to 
implement the Security Council mandates, secured August 29 as the planned 
date for the  completion of Belgian withdrawal of its military units 
from the Congo.    Although when this date arrived there were still some 
Belgian military units in the Congo,   they were removed shortly. 
However,  securing the withdrawal of the Belgian military units did 
not solve the Belgian problem, which was the object of so much criti- 
cism from many nations, but rather only switched it to another phase 
2lUnited Nations  (5/UU0$, July 22,  i960),  p.  3u. 
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in which Belgium, although sometimes singled out as chief, was only 
one of a number of countries with elements accused of aiding and 
abetting Tshombe and the Katanga secession. 
From the beginning the Katanga problem had proved an area of 
friction for the UN operation. As the UN spread out its forces until 
all areas had been entered except Katanga, there was much pressure 
fron the Central Government that this province too had to be entered 
and the Belgian troops evacuated. However, the initial UN plan to 
enter Katanga on August 6, i960 was met by Tshombe's threat to use 
force to prevent its entry. Learning the reality of this threat from 
Dr. Bunche who had been sent to Elizabethville for talks on August k, 
the Secretary-General canceled the sending of UN troops into Katanga 
on August 6 and requested a meeting of the Security Council to deal 
with the situation and clarify the UN's position. On August 9, I960, 
the Security Council adopted a resolution which contained the following 
substantive measures: 
Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw im- 
mediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under 
speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and 
to assist in every possible way the implementation of the 
Council's resolutionsj 
Declares that the entry of the United Nations force 
into the Province of Katanga is necessary for full implemen- 
tation of this resolution; 
Reaffirms that tha United Nations force in the Congo, 
will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used 
to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitu- 
tional or otherwise.22 
Although on grounds of logic one may be able to defend the possi- 
bility of a path of action that would include the UN's entry into 
Katanga and yet avoid the intervention in or influence of the outcome 
of an internal conflict, but in the field such an attempt proved 
22United Nations (5AU26, August 9, I960), pp. 91-92. 
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impossible.2^ In some sense whether the UN acted or did not act in 
a situation it influenced the internal conflict. Its efforts to 
secure the entry of UN forces into Katanga included the Secretary- 
General's talks with Tshombe in Slizabethville and the assurance that 
the UN would not interfere in internal constitutional matters; however, 
Lumumba was greatly provoked, asserting that such talks with Tshombe 
were in fact recognition of his secession and a violation of the 
Security Council resolutions. Thus, although UN forces gained entry 
into Katanga at the end of August, the friction which had been created 
between the UN Operation and the Central Government opened wide other 
problems with Lumumba without really settling very much of the problem 
of Katanga. 
In July and August, I960, the task which the UN faced in the 
Congo seemed to border on the impossible. There were emergencies of 
hunger and disease, the disintegration of the economy entailing further 
unemployment and rioting, the chaotic security situation, the provoking 
presence of Belgian military units, and the problem of gaining entry 
into Katanga. Yet there was at least the surety of a Central Govern- 
ment and no doubt as to which officials were to be consulted with in 
this capacity. However, in September developments in the Congo moved 
the situation into a new phase, one in which there were three men 
claiming power, but where there was actually a vacuum in which " the 
United Nations was the only approximation to an effective government 
left in the Congo."2*1 This situation was the result of President 
23Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: The Un in the Congo 
Labyrinth," International Organization, p. 338. 
1069. 
^"Indispensable UN," The Sconomist, CXCVI (September 17, I960), 
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Kasavubu's ousting of Premier Lumumba in a radio address on September 5 
and a little more than an hour later in a broadcast from that same 
station, Lumumba's ousting of Kasavubu.  In the confusion and struggle 
for power that followed Joseph Mobutu announced on September lU 
that the military was taking over neutralizing both Kasavubu and 
Lumumba until the end of the year. After September $ the struggle 
for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba seemed to penetrate every as- 
pect of life in the Congo, making law and order only secondary to 
itself. Making it even more difficult for the UN Force which sought 
to restore law and order without influencing the outcome of the 
internal crisis between Kasavubu and Lumumba—an impossible task in 
which its efforts drew much criticism—was the factor that nations 
had taken sides in the internal struggle and some had sent or promised 
to send assistance to one of the parties. Any action that the UN 
might take in its efforts to restore law and order, such as its shutting 
down of the Leopoldville radic station and the closing of all airports 
in the Congo to planes not serving the United Nations, had its effects 
on the internal struggle. Because of the circumstances it was usually 
Lumumba who suffered most and his supporters who yelled first and 
loudest their threat of unilateral intervention. 
The months following September, I960, have been most appropriately 
called "the winter of everyone's discontent."25 It was a time of 
great difficulty for both civilian and military aspects of the UN 
Operation in the Congo, and a time of relative stagnation and great 
discontent in New York. "The collision of governmentsin Leopoldville 
25Hoffman, International Organization, p. 337. 
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brought about fresh collision of governments in the United Nations."2^1 
Thus, the secretary-General had difficulty in getting guidance or a 
clearing up of his mandate so as to deal with the new situation. The 
Security Council in its meetings on September 16 and 17, unable to 
get the unanimity of the permanent members on a resolution containing 
a restriction on the sending of aid of a military nature to the Congo 
except through the UN, called for an emergency special session of 
the General Assembly which on September 20, passed a resolution con- 
taining a recommendation to this effect: 
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic 
of the Congo, calls upon all States to refrain from the 
direct and indirect provision of arms or other material 
of war and military personnel and other assistance for 
military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of 
military assistance through the United Nations, except upon 
the request of the United Nations through the Secretary- 
General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution 
and of the resolutions of July lUth and 22nd and of August 9th, 
I960, of the Security Council.27 
It was not until in February, 1961, after the occurrence of many events 
including the death of Lumumba which is said to have "acted as a sudden 
catalyst,"20 that the Security Council was able to break its deadlock, 
and thus, provide the Secretary-General with a mandate, taking into 
account the conditions that had emerged in the Congo since September. 
During this "period of everyone's discontent" when it was diffi- 
cult to reach agreement in New York, the nations were by no means 
inactive in letting their voices be heard and in pursuing their own 
26"Stormy Vacuum," The Economist, CXCVI (September 17, I960), 1062. 
27United Nations (A/1U7U ES-IV),(September 20, i960),p. 1. 
28l,Wider Still Wider," The Economist, CXCVIII (February 25, 1961), 
730. 
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national policies. Nations lined up behind their choice of Kasavubu 
or Lumumba. This division, splitting the world and even Africa itself, 
is illustrated in the debate—a debate which revealed the varying 
viewpoints of those not only who disagreed on the main issue but those 
whose vote was the same—preceding the seating/the Kasavubu delegation 
as the representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Congo 
in the General Assembiy. Although this seating of the Kasavubu dele- 
gation was considered a great victory by the Kasavubu backers, this 
was done in New York and was seen by some as simply the result of 
the United States "railroading tactics."29 However, as for the reality 
of the situation in the Congo itself, it was touch and go. The legality 
of Kasavubu as President was not disputed; however, as for Mobutu's 
military take-over there were no grounds of legality although he did 
in fact hold control. And as for the Ileo government which Kasavubu 
had appointed after he had dismissed Lumumba, it had never been recog- 
nized by Parliament which had reaffirmed its confidence in Lumumba 
on September 6 and then had been sent on its way by tiobutu. 
Although Lumumba had received Parliament's vote of confidence, 
many things had gone badly for him. First of all, he had not been 
able to obtain access to a radio station when the UN took over that 
of Leopoldville and perhaps even more consequential he had not been 
able to fly supporting troops into Leopoldville since the UN closed 
the airports. After September 16 Lumumba had been more-cr-less con- 
fined to his residence by Mobutu troops.  The troops of Mobutu were 
later replaced by UN troops whose purpose was not to confine but merely 
to guard him. However, Lumumba left his residence only to be arrested 
^Alex Quaison-Sackey, Africa Unbound (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1963), p. 90. 
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by Mobutu, mishandled, and later killed in Katanga, where he had been 
handed over by Kasavubu and Mobutu to perhaps his worst enemy, Tshombe. 
Lumumba's murder was not a solution to Western problems in the 
Congo, although thought so by "some misguided men of the lunatic 
fringes in Brussels and Paris."3° The Lumumbist elements were still 
in the Congo led by such men as Gizenga, and Lumumba's murder naturally 
served to inflame opinion among the nations of the world, creating a 
real opportunity for Mr. Khrushchev to launch a fresh attack on the 
UN role in the Congo and the Secretary-General. However, this event— 
bad in itself and most dangerous to world peace and settlement in the 
Congo—did seem to mark a turning point. It seemed to so arouse the 
nations that they were now more of one mind in the realization that 
something must be done. They had already been advised by 
Dag Hammarskjold who, under the pressure of the threats of certain 
nations to withdraw their contingents because of their discontent 
with the UN role in the Congo, had warned that the breakdown of the 
UN operation would mean "immediate civil war, degenerating into 
uninhibited tribal conflict and the complete disintegration of the 
aining fabric of national unity."^0 Likewise, he had warned that re ma: 
the existing mandate did not allow the UN Force to deal with the present 
situation in the Congo which bordered on civil war, and thus,  requested 
from the Security Council a reinforced mandate.    On February 21, the 
Security Council adopted a resolution by a vote of nine to nil with two 
abstentions (France, USSR) that marked a sharp departure or rather a 
long jump from what had been authorized in the more limited earlier 
3°"Down with Peacemakers.""The Economist, CXCVIII (February h, 
1961), U33. 
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resolutions. However, as we give consideration to the significance 
of this resolution, let us keep in mind the actual circumstances in 
the Congo, the desperateness of the situation which the UN faced and 
the probable consequences for the Congo and the world if it should 
fail.'  In this February 21st resolution for the first time the use 
of force was authorized for purposes other than self-defense: "In 
the last resort" force could be used by UN troops to prevent civil 
war. Also, the necessity for the UN to take steps to make available 
aid in regard to conciliation and the convening of parliament was 
recognized, whereas hitherto such moves had been hindered by argu- 
ments that such measures constituted internal intervention. 
Kasavubu reacted with great irritation to the February 21 reso- 
lution, thinking that it tried to tell him what tc do as in regard to 
the convening of parliament and the reorganization of the Congolese 
security forces. However, with time he gradually came to see that he 
had more to gain by working with the UN than by opposing it. 
The next months were filled with efforts by the UN and by the 
Congolese leaders themselves as urged on and aided in every way possi- 
ble by the UN, to achieve reconcilation and the restoration of a legal 
government for the whole of the Congo. Finally in July, Parliament was 
convened in Leopoldville with deputies coming from all over the country 
except Katanga.  Tshombe and his Conakat deputies, although having 
participated in many of the conferences seeking reconciliation, and 
thus, having flirted with the idea, yet in the final and actual coming 
together, refused to be persuaded. Nevertheless, on August 2, 1961, 
^See Appendix I. 
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Kasavubu named a new government headed by Cyrille Aacula and con- 
sisting of ministers representing all political factions in the five 
provinces. This new cabinet received unanimous approval of both 
houses and the new government of national unity was resolved to be 
the legal sucessor to the first Central Government of the Republic 
of the Congo. Thus, a chapter of the Congo story was ended and another, 
in which there was once again a legal Central Government with which the 
UN could consult, began. 
The attempted secession of Katanga had been a problem for the 
Congo since Tshombe's declaration on July 11, I960. It had been from 
the beginning a source of great difficulty to the UN Force whose man- 
date applied to the entire Congo, a country of six provinces, one of 
which was Katanga. Not only had Katanga been the last and by far the 
most difficult province from which to obtain the withdrawal of Belgian 
military units and tc gain UN entry, but in the process of doing so 
the Central Government had been antagonized. The dilemma of the UN 
in regard to Katanga as noted in the Security Council resolution of 
August 9, I960, had been that UN troops had to enter the province of 
Katanga but at the same time it could "not be a party to or in any 
way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of an internal 
conflict, constitutional or otherwise."32 However, now a year had 
passed and Katanga was still very much a problem to the Congo and to 
the UN. The near-anarchy which had existed for some time after the 
collapse of the Central Government and the following struggle for 
power, and then the very slow course back to having a new government 
32united Nations (5/UU26, August 9, I960), pp. 91-92. 
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of national unity, could hardly help but have made a deep impression 
on the UN operation and all who were involved. Also to be remembered, 
is that Adoula was quite different from Lumumba as a person. Although 
very much committed to the reintegration of Katanga into the Republic 
of the Congo and perhaps even with the endurance of his government 
dependent upon his success in this venture, Adoula's ways of seeking 
UN help differed greatly from those of Lumumba.  Keeping these things 
in mind as well as the provoking events in Katanga itself and the 
shifting policies of some nations as they realized the multi-impli- 
cation of the continued Katanga secession, we can more nearly understand 
the gradual change in the UN approach to the problem of Katanga and 
the fighting between the UN forces and Katanga gendarmerie that oc- 
cured in September and December, 1961 and in December, 1962. 
In considering these three occurrences of fighting between UN 
and Katangese forces, each must be seen in relation to what had come 
before it. In the September, 1961, operation the UN, more hesitant 
and unsure of its path, was quick to respond both to the criticism of 
some of the European nations and to the slightest, hope given them by 
Tshombe by calling a cease-fire. However, in the December, 1961, 
and even more in the December, 1962, operations, not only was the UN 
force as the result of equipment available to it more capable of dealing 
with the situation effectively, it was also a little more hesitant to 
accept Tshombe's words until they were evidenced by some action. 
On each occasion there was much opposition and criticism of the 
UN action by some sources. There were those individuals and nations 
who were just generally against the use of force by the UN, a peace- 
keeping organization. Even though each of the operations was defended 
by the UN as required in self-defense, there were groups (e.q. investors 
in Union Miniere) who sought to prove the actions of an offensive 
nature and even set up a propaganda machine emphasizing the violence 
involved and perhaps facricating or staging their own scenes with the 
help of Tshombe. Also there were breaks in communication between 
New York, Leopoldville and the field in Katanga that were not only 
a source of difficulty for the UN in carrying out its activities, but 
led to contradictory statements by UN officials that were quick to be 
seized as opportunities by opposing propagandists. 
The stakes, economic as well as otherwise, in the Congo were 
high, and thus, there were elements in various countries, especially 
in Belgium, Britain, France. Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, if 
not the countries themselves, which could afford to invest a lot in 
attempting to insure that its outcome be in their favor. It was, in 
fact, these elements of foreign intervention which made the Katanga 
secession so blatantly an international problem. That the Katanga 
province remain within the Congo was seen by the Central Government 
and by the other African states as necessary for the economic viabi- 
lity of the Congo and for the prevention of a precedent that could 
lead to the balkanization of the Continent. However, it was the 
belief, substantiated by much evidence, that the Katanga secession was 
provoked and maintained by foreign elements working with Union Miniere 
and the white population and had little of an African indigenous 
basis, that made it so clearly an international, rather than just 
an internal situation in which the UN could not interfere. As time 
went by and circumstances changed and international ramifications 
became more complex, UN approach to the Katanga problem came to reflect 
33 
more and more the African viewpoint toward secession and territorial 
74.* +r*mJ 
integrity..  Vis evidenced in the Security Council's resolution of 
November 2U, 1961, adopted by a vote of nine to nil with two absten- 
tions (France,  United Kingdom).     This resolution with its strong lan- 
guage conveys a new seriousness in tone.    No longer is  there any hesi- 
tancy with regard to backing the Central Government.     The Secretary- 
General is even authorized to use force if necessary for the appre- 
hension deportation of      foreign military personnel.33 
During this period from September, 1961 to January, 1963,  inclu- 
sive of the three short fighting involvements of the UN force in 
Katanga,  Tshombe continued as before to flirt with the UN and the 
Central Government in regard to reentry into the Central Government, 
saying one  thing and doing another, bringing false dawns with the 
reconciliation agreements to which when in a tight spot he would agree 
out then fail to implement to any significant decree.     By July, 1962, 
it was becoming clear once again that the Katangese authorities 
were stalling for time and that they had no intentions of carrying 
out the terms of tne Kitona Declaration—a basis for the reintegration 
of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo agreed upon after the 
December,  196l,  cease-fire.    Not only were the  Katangese authorities 
not making any forward moves toward a united Congo there was an in- 
crease of violent acts against the UN Force in Elizabethville and 
indications of an excitement of anti-UN surtiment among the people. 
On July 31 the Secretary-General appealed to member states to 
use all their influence and efforts to bring about a settlement of 
the Katanga problem and in August he submitted a plan of national 
reconciliation for the approval of the Central Government and the 
33see Appendix II. 
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Katangese authorities.    This plan,  having been worked out in consul- 
tation with nations which were in special positions to  influence or 
put pressure on Tshombe, had the teeth of national power behind it.3U 
Attached to it was a four-phase course of action entailing the planned 
attempt for the member states to try to bring their influence to bear 
on Tshombe so  that he would accept this peaceful solution;  if he did 
not accept the Plan within the  ten-day period,   then they would be re- 
quested to apply economic sanctions;  if in turn the economic sanctions 
were not effective, then consultation to determine other applicable 
measures would be in order.3$ 
The Central Government and the Katangese authorities approved 
the plan, but as to its implementation,  the Katangese authorities 
continued thein old routine.    However,   this time, with the accompanying 
four-phase course of action and the growing support of the nations, 
the UN operation was more prepared to demand that Tshombe back his 
words with actions.    And when Tshombe,  finally backed into a corner 
from which he found it more and more difficult to talk his way out, 
responded with gendarmerie attacks on the UN forces in Elizabethville, 
after six days without retaliation,  the UN force on December 28, 1962, 
returned its fire.     This time being better prepared, and perhaps 
somewhat because of failures in communication,   the UN force pushed on 
to obtain its freedom of movement not only in Elizaoethville but as 
far as Jadotville.    Although Tshombe continued to threaten for some- 
time with a "scorched earth" policy and a fight to the last man, by 
3^King Gordon,  The United Nations in the Congo;    A Quest for Peace, 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p.   179. 
35vearbook of the United Nations,   1962  (New York:     United Nations 
Publication, 196U), p.  72. 
January 21, 1963, UN troops peacefully entered Kolwezi,  the last 
Tshombe stronghold.    UN troops now held the important centres previ- 
ously held by the Katangese gendarmerie and the mercenaries, which 
the UN for so long had tried to apprehend, were now on the run, 
mostly toward the Angolan border.    With these actualities and with 
Tshombe stating his determination to carry out the Secretary-General's 
Plan of National Reconciliation,  there was once again the dawn of 
hope that Katanga's attempt at secession—which U Thant had cited 
only a few months before as   the main cause of the continuing state 
of affairs in the Congo^6— had ended. 
After two and a half years the Secretary-General in his report 
to the Security Council on February U, 1963, was able to say that 
"a decisive phase in the United Nations Congo experience has been 
concluded. n->7    Although military assistance would continue to be 
required for some time to ensure that what had been achieved in 
the two and a half years did not fall apart,  to aid in the delicate 
problem of the reintegration of Katanga into the Central Government, 
and to assist the Central Government "in coping with endemic problems 
op 
of tribal warfare and maintenance of law and order,"        yet beginning 
in February there would be a gradual phasing out of the military 
forces. 
In a later report the Secretary-General noted that by September 
36Gordon, p. 178. 
3?U Thant, "The Congot An Account of United Nations Action 
and a Look Ahead," United Nations Review, X (February, 1963), p. 12. 
38ibid. 
13, 1963, the force in the Congo which had once numbered 20,000 
had been reduced to 7,975.^9    As he continued to report he noted 
that the mandates in large measure had been implemented,  that at 
present there was no danger of secessionist movements,  that territorial 
integrity and political independence had been maintained, that civil 
war had been prevented and there were at present no serious threats. 
Basic to all these,   the Secretary-General also reported that "for 
the first time in its more than three years of independence it would 
appear that no organized and subversive military groups under the 
leadership of foreign military personnel are active on Congolese 
territory."kO    However, at the same time that the Secretary-General 
reported the definite turning point which this year had brought 
about in the implementing of the mandates for the Congo,  he noted 
the persisting problems of tribal conflict and the lack of discipline 
in the ANC (National Security Forces).     It was in recognition of 
these problems and other "uncertainties and imponderables in the 
Congo situation11   that the UN not only is continuing its technical 
assistance on as large a scale as is financially possible but has 
agreed to the request of Premier Adoula to continue a small force 
until June, 1°6U. 
^9U Thant,  "Military Disengagement in the Congo," United 
Nations Review, X (October, 1963),  p. UU. 
1*0 Ibid., p.  U5. 
in: BELGIUM, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE 
In many respects we can fruitfully look at the policies of 
Belgium, Britain, and France together. All three nations had been 
involved for some time with their colonies in Africa—a factor which 
greatly colored their present approach to the Congo. They also had 
economic interests in the Congo. As investors especially in Union 
Miniere de Haut Katanga, Belgian, British, and French citizens were 
greatly interested and often involved in events in Katanga. These 
similar interests and experiences often resulted in Belgian, Britain 
and France following a similar policy with regard to the UN Operation 
in the Congo. 
It is not my purpose to castigate Belgium for possible failures 
and shortcomings of its colonial policy in the Congo, although many 
others have done so. Let us rather look at what its policy has been 
since the Congo's independence and the launching of the UN operation. 
When the Force Publique mutinied and there was no protection for the 
Belgians and other Europeans in the Congo against the increasing 
violences, Belgium, without being asked by the independent Congo 
Government, nevertheless sent in its troops from the two bases in 
the Congo and dispatched others from Belgium itself. Although this 
intervention has been defended by the reasoning that "it would have 
been completely impossible for the United Nations, with every State 
possessing serious defense forces barred for ideological reasons, 
to have found the number of troops required in time to save the 
situation," and thus, "there can be little room for doubt that 
Belgium saved her nationals from a final disaster by her action,"k1 
yet Belgium did violate another country's sovereignty. 
Having said that the reason for its troops being there was to 
protect its nationals, Belgium, as logically expected, agreed to with- 
draw its troops whenever the UN forces were able to take over the respon- 
sibility of law and order and the protection of individuals. This 
process, however, was not just the UN going in and the Belgians going 
out; there were the complications of Katanga, and of what "out" 
really meant. For a while the Belgians maintained that a withdrawal 
to the Belgian military bases of Kamina and Kitona, held according 
to the Loi fondamentale, constituted "withdrawal." With time and much 
effort by the UN, Belgium responded to the demands of the Security 
Council and the efforts of the Secretary-General, and its military 
units were withdrawn from the Congo, including Katanga and the mili- 
tary bases. 
The presence of the Belgian military units, however, had been 
only the most obvious element of foreign intervention. Belgium, if 
subject at all to the pressures of world opinion, could hardly have 
avoided withdrawing its military units; however, it was much easier 
to be evasive along with others, with regard to the withdrawal of 
individual "military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers 
not under United Nations command, and mercenaries."^ Katanga especi- 
ally, with its economic stakes due to the large mining complex and 
ulCyril Falls, "The Congo Tangle Still Unravelled," The Illus- 
trated London News, August 6, I960, p. 218. 
^United Nations (S/U7U1, February 21, 196l) pp. 1U7-1U8. 
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its already relatively large European community, had proved to be 
quite a harbor for such elements. 
Since the Belgian network had been so extensive before the 
Congo's independence,   there were many factors leading to the return 
of the Belgians,  a return which was sharply criticized in November,  I960, 
in the second report of Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal,  the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General in the Congo.     There were so many going back 
to the Congo that Sabena had to have extra airlines to carry them. 
Many of these returning Belgians were employees of private firms,   for 
which the Belgian Government said it was not responsible,   but others 
were returning to employment in Congolese administration.^3   Although 
the Belgian Government had been asked to withdraw its "officials and 
experts" from the Congo and to channel its aid through the UN,  "it 
retorted that all who had returned to the  Congo were there by invitation 
of the duly constituted authorities—a reply that must have jarred on 
the ears of UN officials, who invited in by the   'Government of the 
Republic of  the Congo,' have since been unable to identify their 
host."W*    The Belgians, aided by the belief that they knew more about 
the Congo and its administration than anyone else,  sometimes assumed 
a rather superior and uncooperating attitude toward the UN operation. 
This attitude, which added to the difficulty of the UN task, is conveyed 
very well in an article written by Belgium's Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs,   19$8-6l—Pierre Wigny.^5    However,   as far as the substance of 
^"Belgians Return to the Congo," The Economist,  CXCVII (November 5, 
I960),  p.   57. 
^"Belgium's Return," The Economist,   CXCVII (November 19,  I960), p.76$. 
^Pierre Wigny,  "Belgium and the Congo," International Affairs, XXXVII 
(July,  1961), pp. 273-28U. 
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the argument of the Belgian experts knowing more about the country, 
knowing the African dialects,  and in general, being able to fill in 
this emergency the vacuum left by themselves, there is much to be 
said.    So much in fact that before the end of the UN operation there 
was much use being made of the Belgian experts; however,  before this 
came to be,  there had been a change of attitude brought by the inter- 
vening events. 
There has been much discussion about the part that Belgium's 
economic interests in the Con^o has played in determining its recent 
policy.    Britain, Belgium, and France all had great stakes especially 
in Union Miniere de Haut Katanga.    What happened in the Congo, especially 
in Katanga was very important.     If the mining complex was nationalized 
as they feared might be the case if there were a united Congo with the 
"leftist" Lumumba at its head,   they stood to lose immensely.     Even 
if the lack of law and order brought about a standstill in production, 
their lost would be great.     The official policy of the Belgian Govern- 
ment had been from before independence to support a unified Congo. 
Even after the attempted secession of Katanga in which Moise Tshombe 
expressed the desire to continue economic ties with Belgium and re- 
quested more Belgian troops  to maintain law and order, Belgium main- 
tained a formal policy of non-recognition.     However,  this official 
policy of non-recognition, which was necessary for the world scene, 
did not mean that Belgium refused "to register its separation as a 
fact."U6    There must have seemed many benefits to Belgian as well as 
to British and French investors in having the most economically important 
^igny,  International Affairs,  p.  282. 
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province cut off from the danger of Lumumba and the general turmoil 
in other parts of the Congo. 
Belgian policy,  however, did not stay the same throughout the 
UN Operation in the Congo.     Changing circumstances in the Congo and in 
the world as well as changes in Belgian administration had their effects. 
With Paul-Henri Spaak's entry in the Belgian Cabinet in 1961 there came 
a different outlook which reflected a wider and farther-seeing ap- 
proach to the Congo situation and UN policy.     There was more of an at- 
tempt to work with the UN operation such as in its collaboration in 
August,  1962, in regard to the Secretary-General's Plan of National 
Reconciliation, with Mr.   Spaak even going so far as to back the possi- 
bility of economic sanctions which would have been harmful to his 
own economy.    Of course,   public opinion in Belgium remained divided 
and Mr. Spaak's policies were greatly criticized by some.'1' 
France, with economic interests in the Congo closely tied to 
those of Britain and Belgium, and with interests resulting from its 
close ties with many of the African nations,  followed a policy simi- 
lar to that of Belgium and Britain, but not losing its peculiarly 
French character in its attitude toward UN enterprise.    As explained 
by one source:     "Incensed by the Suez incident, and angered by the 
repeated needling they regularly received from the Assembly on Algeria, 
the French have been somewhat less than enthusiastic about the Organization 
during the past few years."W    These specifics however were only aggravations 
^"Belgians and Katanga," The Economist,   CCV (December 22, 1962), 1213. 
^Francis 0. Wilcox,  "United States Policy in the United Nations," 
The United States and the United Nations,   ed.  Francis 0. tfilcox and H.   Field 
Haviland, Jr., p.  163. 
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of an already existing antipathy to UN enterprise in so far as it puts 
any restraints on national power.U9    France, by abstaining from voting 
on all of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo situation with 
the exception one—that of July 22,  I960, which was in large measure 
repetitive of what had previously been passed—and by refusing to pay 
any of its assessments for ONUC,  continued to show its feelings toward 
the enterprises of the Organization in general and to the Operation in 
the Congo in specific.     (A veto on the Security Council resolutions 
which were disagreeable to French sympathies with Katanga would have 
been most unlikely since the U.S.  and the Afro-Asian countries were 
in agreement.)5°    At the same time,   France along with Belgium and 
Britain,  altho-gh not officially recognizing Katanga,  encouraged 
Tshombe and gave local support to the secession of Katanga in the hopes 
of best protecting its economic interests.    French policy on the whole 
went hand in hand with Belgian, as many of their interests were the 
same; however,  in the latter days of the UN Operation when Belgium was 
being noted for various constructive plans,  France and Britain were 
seen to still be "dragging their feet in the usual colonialist manner."51 
Many things have been said and many interpretations made of Britain's 
policy in the United Nations and in the Congo.    Britain has been both 
praised and denounced for its actions.    Arthur L.  Burns praises its 
"legal and statesmanly scruples"  and castigates Britain in this respect 
k9»How to Use the UN," The Economist,  CCil (January 20,  1962), 202. 
5°0'Brien,  p. 98. 
5l"A Kaunde-Tshombe Axis," New Statesman, LXIV (December 28, 
1961), 918. 
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only for allowing them to be "overcome by a fear of disagreeing too 
openly with the U.S."52    However, quite oppositely,  other commen- 
tators have objected to Britain's conduct saying that in regard to 
Katanga it has  been "hypocritical and underhand": 
While publicly endorsing the object of UN Congo operation, 
the British government has,  in practice,  sought to prevent 
its attainment.    Its UN delegation has,   on a number of oc- 
casions proved oostructivej  its local Congo representatives 
have brazenly interfered in UN operations; and its response 
to UN requests for arms and munitions has been arbitrary 
and disingenuous.53 
Conor Cruise O'Brien after the September,  196l, military operation 
in Katanga, saw the British Government as   'principally responsible 
for the survival of the State of Katanga."5U    in explaining and justi- 
fying his judgment, Mr.   O'Brien after discussing what subjective factors 
may have prejudiced him then enumerates the objective which to him 
seem to incriminate the British."    The incriminating specifics which 
Mr. O'Brien is able to present because of his i/iside view in Katanga 
tend to back up the more generalized statements made not only by him 
but by so many other commentators in regard to Britain's  two-fold 
policy which allowed its ministers to claim that "they have   'all along' 
supported a strong united Congo;  supported the UN; opposed only the 
use of force"56 while at the saoe time giving active local support to 
5 Burns, p. 66. 
53»Obstructing the Law," New Statesman,   LXII (December 29, 1961), 977. 
5Uo'3rien,  p.   30U. 
55lbid., pp. 305-306. 
56Erskine E.   Childers,   "The O'Brien Indictment," The Spectator,  CCVII 
(December 8, 196l),  852. 
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Tshombe through the British Consul in Elizabethville and Sir Roy 
ielensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Southern Rhodesia and 
N grassland. 
Opinion in Britain as to the policy to be followed with regard to 
the UN and the Katanga problem was greatly divided. Also, the considera- 
tions which were oefore the British Government were perhaps more numerous 
and complex than these seen and faced by many governments. It was a fact 
that British financial interests in the Union Miniere were extensive and 
that those directly involved attempted to influence the aritish Govern- 
ment. However, how great their influence was and how much British 
policy was determined by comrercial motivation is deoatable. 
There are those who attribute British position in regard to Katanga 
almost solely to commercial motives, saying that those with financial 
interests in Union Miniere "ruthlessly and successfully persuaded the 
government to lend devious support to the Tshombe regime."57 There 
does seem reason to believe that not only private British citizens, but 
also government officials and policies did give local support to Tshombe 
and the Katangese regime not only by their actions, but even more often 
by their inaction. However, to explain many of British actions such as 
the calling for a cease-fire each time there was fighting between the 
UN Force and the Katangese troops or its continual opposition to the 
use of force by the UN as a means of ending the Katanga secession, as 
being solely attempts to protect British financial interests through 
the preservation of a separate Katanga would of course be foolishly 
misleading and gross oversimplification. 
57'»Lord Home's Pocket Suez," New Statesman, LXII (December 8, 
1969), 86$. 
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In objecting to the use of force in Katanga,  Britain argued that 
such a means was "alien to the nature of an organization such as the 
UN,  whose proper function is prevention of war by means of conciliation 
and mediation.'^    The concern which Britain showed for the UN's setting 
a precedent in using force as a means to achieve its objectives was 
highly warranted.    Such a precedent perhaps entailed a devastating danger 
for the future of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization. 
According to some interpretations,   British concern reflected a diplo- 
matic maturity and regard for "legal and statesmanly scruples," lacking 
in other nations which were more preoccupied with success in this one 
situation.'"    However, the effects of British scruples on this specific 
situation were such as to perpetuate the Katanga secession, and thus, 
to cast some doubt on the purity of British motives. 
Britain disapproved not only the use of military force but economic 
pressures as well.    Quite an argument can be made to show the wisdom 
of Britain's policy against the use of military force by the UNj how- 
ever, Britain did not propose or support any alternative solution. 
Both Britain and France "failed to say what should happen when a man- 
date is resisted with foroe or where arbitration does not succeed."60 
Even when economic pressures were seen as the only possible way to 
save the UN from either using military force or abandoning the Congo 
to chaos, Britain refused to support economic sanctions against Tshombe. 
With regard to the plan of economic sanctions incorporated as a 
part of the four-phase course of action attached to the Secretary- 
58Burns, p.  110. 
59Ibid.t pp. 66, 111, et passim. 
60 
Ibid., p.  110. 
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General's Plan of National Reconciliation, Britain's support, along 
with that of Belgium and the United States which had already been 
pledged,   could have been of crucial importance.    What Britain was in 
a position to do is made evident in the following statement: 
Tshombe's significant neighbors are North Rhodesia, which 
has a British Governor and belongs to a Federation for 
which Britain is internationally responsible, and Portu- 
guese Angola, whose railway line into Katange is owned 
by Tanganyika Concessions,  a largely (though not entirely) 
British company.     If there are to be any economic sanctions, 
so as to avoid the need for force,  Britain must be primarily 
instrumental in applying them."1 
However, Britain did not choose, by taking a primary part or even 
supporting at all the plan for economic sanctions,  to thereby defend 
itself against earlier accusations in New York in regard to its 
to "failing to support,   if not actually sabotaging the UN action,"0<:
or to make evident its professed sincerity with regard to opposing 
Katanga secession.     Instead Britain remained prominent among those 
too many governments which desire "to believe that the United Nations 
can be more than the sum of its parts while working busily to ensure 
that it is not."^3    its proposals of cease-fire and its opposition 
to the UN's use of force may have been in the best long-run interest 
of the United Nations, but what alternatives did Britain help provide? 
6lKeith Kyle,  "Britain, the UN and Katanga," "The Spectator, CCH 
(August 17, 1962),  212. 
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62"Britain and the UN", The Spectator, CCVII (December 1$,  196l), 
63"Crisis of Confidence," The Spectator,  CCVIII (January $, 1?62),  3. 
IV:  COLD WAR ASPECTS 
Recognizing that the situation in the Congo was a danger to 
international peace and security, the United Nations rushed in to 
aid the Congolese in this emergency and to attempt to insulate the 
crisis from the great power rivalry. To the extent that the UN was 
able to do this, it showed itself "the embryo of a third Force" able 
to intercede between the committed power blocs, keeping them from a 
further clashing. ^ However, did the UN Operation really succeed in 
keeping the big powers out of the Congo? Or, was its success in that 
it prevented a head-on clash by making big power intervention more 
indirect, and thereby, less explosive? It is true that the UN helped 
to prevent the Congo becoming either another Korea or the scene of 
another Spanish Civil War, however, not even the UN Operation itself 
was free from being influenced by Cold War maneuvers. Thus, the 
struggle of the blocs continued both in New York, where nations 
attempted to shape UN policy so as to bring about in the Congo situa- 
tion that which they considered favorable to them, and in the Congo 
where they supported their choce of leader, if not with armed inter- 
vention or quantities of military supplies, at least with recognition, 
promises, and indirect aid. 
Some nations because of the very nature and purposes of the United 
Nations, because of the voting strength of member nations which usually 
6k"The Missionary without a Dogma," New SI 
I960), 201. 
», LX (August 13, 
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agree with them, and perhaps somewhat because of their financial 
support, have succeeded more often than others in influencing UN 
policies and actions to go along with their national policies rather 
than working against them. The clearest example of this is the in- 
fluence in the United Nations of the United States in contrast to 
that of the Soviet Union. Of course, it is argued that according to 
voting, the U.S. is less able than ever to be assured of an automatic 
majority in the United Nations.  (Is this the result of many nations 
turning toward agreement with and backing of Russian measures or is 
it rather that more and more nonalighed countries are making up their 
minds according to the facts of a specific situation instead of voting 
in bloc style, and that Russia in attempting to play their "most loyal 
friend" often is found voting with them?) 
The Soviet Union, although trying in every possible way to increase 
its influence generally of UN policy by changing the structure and 
membership of the Organization and to influence specific operations 
by its hammering away with speeches, accusations and other attempts 
to create support for its proposals and its views of implementation, 
nevertheless, just has not been successful in getting its objectives 
achieved through the United Nations. In fact, in the Congo situation, 
the Soviet Union would have had not just to supplement the United 
Nations activities in order to ensure favorable results in the Congo, 
but as it learned soon after the launching of the UN Operation, it 
would probably have to work the harder to counteract the "natural" 
effects of the UN being there. 
From the beginning of the Congo situation, Russia labeled the 
Belgians as "aggressors" and at every opportunity it continued to 
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denounce Belgium "aggression" and to keep this issue primary in the 
nations'  eyes.    This   denunciation of the "colonialist" was only a 
part of Russia's attempt to use African sensitivity and emotionalism 
in regard to their fear of the reimposing of a form of colonialism 
or neo-colonialism, not just against Belgium but against the other 
NATO powers, especially the U.S., and even against the UN itself. 
However, Soviet efforts to show itself to be black Africa's best 
friend did not all take a negative cast as its being against any 
form of colonialism.    The Soviet Union also offered and gave support 
to Lumumba and his followers in the Congo, who more than any other 
represented the nationalist movement cutting across tribal lines. 
This support took both the form of indirect aid through attempts to 
get the UN to take actions against the Belgians and in Katanga accord- 
ing to the desires and expectations of Lumumba,  and also direct 
unilateral aid, such as the trucks, planes,  and technicians sent to 
Lumumba for pursuance of his objectives in Katanga.    However,   the 
increasing Soviet activity in the Congo which scared the West as it 
saw Lumumba turning more and more to the Soviet Union, was given a 
startling blow when Mr. Mobutu took over after the Kasavubu-Lumumba 
schism and sent warnings to the Russian and Czechoslovakian diplomats 
that if they had not left the country by noon the following day (Septem- 
ber 17, i960)  they would be arrested and deported. 
Russia in its efforts to extend its influence in the Congo and 
in the United Nations had been given quite a set back by the events 
and actions during September, i960.    Not only had the effects of the 
UN Force attempts to restore law and order after the Kasavubu-Lumumba 
schism, such as its closing of the Leopoldville radio station and the 
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airports, been disfavorable to Lumumba, but soon thereafter in New 
York Russia found it necessary to veto a Security Council resolution 
which was supported by the Afro-Asian countries, Russia, thus,lost the 
possible support that might otherwise have been derived from the 
recent UN activities disfavorable to Lumumba,    With the exception 
of the African states in the French Community, Africa and the other 
neutral countries backed Lumumba as the Congo's nationalist leader. 
They thus took affront or were at least very concerned with the 
September activities of the UN Force in the Congo.    However,   they 
were strongly against foreign intervention in the Congo whether of 
the Belgian or the Russian type.    Therefore, after Russia vetoed the 
Security Council resolution which would have required of all countries 
that all aid of any possible military nature be sent to the Congo 
only through the UN operation,  a similar resolution was passed by an 
Emergency Session of the General Assembly called according to the 
Uniting for Peace R-esolution of 1950.    The Soviet Union,   its interests 
suffering in both the Congo itself with the anti-Communist Mobutu in 
power and Lumumba somewhat undercover, and in New York,  Blet loose the 
full force of its propaganda against Hammarskjold,  and began to cam- 
paign for the 'troika1.n°5   As commented on by one astute observer: 
This was hardly surprising, for the Soviet Union had seen 
resolutions,  for which it had voted, used in such a way— 
even stretched in such a way—as to bring about the closing 
of its own Embassy.    I am not a supporter of the interna- 
tional policies of the Soviet Union, but I cannot say that 
I find its reaction on this occasion so   'irrational',   'in- 
comprehensible',  or 'blindly destructive' as many Western 
commentators found it,  or affected to find it.    Granted that 
650«Brien, p. 96. 
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the Soviet Union was 'interfering in the internal affairs 
of the Congo1,   so also were the United States,  Great Britain 
and almost everybody with an Embassy in Leopoldville—-not 
to mention Belgium.    The difference was that the Western 
powers   'won*--with considerable help from at least one 
United States   citizen.    Any gffat power similarly treated 
would have reacted similarly."" 
The Soviet Union's attack on the Secretary-General and the UN 
Operation was not supported by the Afro-Asian nations, which, although 
somewhat disillusioned by the recent activities of UN Operation, 
showed great wisdom in realizing the importance of the UN and its 
Operation in the Congo for their future.    However,  this attack did 
not consume all of Russian energies for it was only one portion of 
their efforts and policies toward the UN and its Operation in the 
Congo.    Seemingly,  according to many of Russian reactions, its policy 
was in general that if it could not capture then perhaps it could kill. 
However, its hopes to capture, or at least influence things somewhat 
its way, flickered enough throughout the operation to keep its efforts 
high in the UN.     Meanwhile,   the Soviet Union continued to threaten with 
its support and possible interventions in the Congo to aid the Lumum- 
bist elements.    The threat of Russian intervention towered over the 
heads of the West,   especially the U.S. whose fear of an "African Cuba" 
determined much of its resoluteness in areas where deoisions had 
hitherto proved difficult to make. 
Cold War aspects played their part in determining the actions and 
policies of all nations.    African nations feared the possibility of 
the Cold War rivalry on the Continent.    Belgium, Britain, and France- 
nations whose local support of the Katanga secession made somewhat 
66 Ibid. 
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dubious their formal expressions—nevertheless found it necessary 
with the rest of the states in the Western bloc, not to recognize 
Katanga.    Consideration of Cold War factors demanded precedence: 
To recognize Katanga would offer the Russians the chance 
not only to set the rest of the Congo against Katanga,  but 
also to turn all Africa rorth of Katanga against the white- 
dominated territories south of it .... No western state— 
and certainly no Nato state—will want to present the Russians 
with such an opportunity to assume the guardianship of black 
Africa—a feat which might well end with communist penetration 
not only of the Congo, but of other African states as well."? 
However,  even though the policies of all nations were influenced somewhat 
by the fear of the Cold War being brought into the Congo and Africa, 
it was U.S.   policies which were so obviously and totally determined 
by Cold War considerations. 
Surely,   one might ask,   the United States is not to be criticized 
for letting what is the most real and immediate danger to its national 
interests determine  the nature of its policies.    No,   this is not the 
substance of this criticism,  for is it not true that every nation's 
policies are shaped by the dangers, needs, and opportunities which are 
real to them?    However,  as with the lives of individuals, do not 
national policies reflect a variance of the breadth and depth of reality 
with which nations see the world?    Is the United States not more capable 
than is shown in some of its policies of having made real to its people 
more than just their immediacies, and having this reflected more wisely 
in its policies? 
The United States had supported the launching of the UN Operation 
in the Congo as authorized by Security Council resolutions which 
included measures to be taken toward obtaining Belgian withdrawal. 
i 
^'•Salvage, not Sabotage", The Economist, CVC (July 23, I960),  33U. 
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However, there was no evidence of any real pressure put upon Belgium 
by the United States in these early months as was later to be seen. 
The U.S.  seemed to more or less condone Belgian activities in the Congo 
or at least devoted its full attention to Soviet activities.     This 
is illustrated by one observer who even as late as January,  196l, writes: 
Last week, instead of supporting Mr. Hammarskjold's 
strictures on the Belgians for allowing Mobutu's 
troops to pass through Ruanda-Urundi,  the West chose 
to chase the Soviet hare in the Security Council-- 
thereby tactily endorsing the Belgian action. 
The U.S.   in these early months of the Congo Operation seemed hesitant 
to step out from its fellow Western bloc members.    Although there was 
the existing danger of the Belgian and rightist intervention in Katanga— 
a situation which had brought such concern to African nations and to 
Lumumba—the United States was pre-occupied with the seemingly "lift- 
ward" turn of Lumumba.    Thus,  in the September Kasavubu-Lumumba schism 
the U.S. put its influence and support behind the moderate Kasavubu 
and even Colonel Mobutu who "seemed more pliable,  to have some sort of 
military force, and to be anti-Communist as well.69    Not realizing or 
disregarding the strong views of the African nations "that legitimacy 
is the strongest safeguard against the return of colonialism" and that 
"whatever Lumumba's faults" most Africans believed him to be the legal 
premier of the Congo,"'''0    Eisenhower pursued his policy of vigorously 
backing Kasavubu and of subsidizing the coup d'etat of Mobutu.71 
68nThe weakening of the Triumvirate," New Statesman, LXI (January 20, 
1961), 78. 
69«Last Chance for the Congo," New Statesman,  LX (December 17, 
I960), 953. 
7°Ibid. 
71Anthony Hartley, "By Confusion Stand," The Spectator,  CCV 
(December 23,  I960),  1010. 
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There has been much concern in regard to the excessive influence 
of the United States on the United Nations, this concern has been 
generated frequently by doubt as to whether this is best in the long 
run for the ability of the UN to meet the world's peace-keeping needs. 
It is a reality that the U.S. with its national purposes largely in 
agreement with UN aims and its position as a world power is in a 
natural position of influence in the United Nations; however, whether 
it uses its influence blatantly to carry out its national will or whether 
it allows it to bring its natural toll while in making decisions taking 
into consideration the views which others hold, is dependent upon U.S. 
attitude and policy. During the operation in the Congo, the UN activi- 
ties have generally been in accordance with U.S. national policy, so 
much so, that the West has secured even through the UN a westward leaning 
of the Congolese leaders. However, U.S. policy or the nature of its 
influence has by no means remained the same throughout the course of 
the UN Operation in the Congo. The U.S. may have continued to see 
its policies carried out by the UN Operation but after the first half 
year or so the determination of its policies became more subject to 
the realities of the Congo situation and the viewpoints of the Afro- 
Asian nations. 
An example of more blatantly offensive imposition of U.S. policies 
in the United Nations occurred in November, I960. By looking at this 
one situation in some detail, one can get some insight into many of 
the workings and policies in New York. At this time the situation in 
the Congo was so uncertain due to the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism and the 
Mobutu coup in September, and the nations were so divided in their views 
and support. Nevertheless, the U.S. holding an "automatic majority" in 
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the Credentials Committee, a committee which consisted of the U.S., 
Costa Rica, Haiti,   New Zealand,  the Philippines, Spain, Morocco, UAR, 
and USSR,  succeeded in getting the Kasavubu delegation seated in the 
General Assembly.     Briefly, the circumstances in which this took place 
were as follows.    Both Kasavubu and Lumumba had sent delegations to 
the UN after their split;  however, with things as they were in the Congo 
itself there was uncertainty not only about the legality, but perhaps 
more important, about the effect which the seating of one delegation 
would have on the internal power struggle.    The UN had committed itself 
to a policy of noninterference in the internal political struggles in 
the Congo even though its efforts to restore law and order did have 
political effects.    Upholding the right of the Congolese to determine 
for themselves their government and leaders, the Advisory Committee of 
the Secretary-General on the Congo had, however, agreed to send in a 
Conciliation Commission to aid the Congolese.    Thus,  to some nations 
■••• the seating of •'delegation would not only be aiding one faction, and 
thereby, effecting the internal struggle, but at this time would be 
most disasterous,  endangering any positive results of the Conciliation 
Commission.    The views expressed by the member states in the General 
Assembly debate showed much variance of attitude and considerations, 
however, in the end the vote was largely along Cold War lines.    As 
described by on African delegate: 
So strong were the railroading tactics,  so furious the 
charges and countercharges, and so thick the suspicions 
that all delegations, including the African ones, seemed 
divided solely along the lines of Cold War allegiances— 
for or against the United States or Russia.'2 
The United States achieved its objective in seating the Kasavubu 
7?Quaison-Sackey, p. 98. 
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delegation even though at that very time Kasavubu refused entry to 
the Conciliation Commission and UN forces were being attacked by Kasavubu- 
Mobutu troops.    Although this achievement of the U.S. corresponded with 
its other efforts since it had panicked at Lumumba's leftward movement, 
yet was it really in the best interest of the Congo, the UN, or even 
the U.S.?    Certain British subjects had indicated their doubt in the 
wisdom of this action by expressing the hope that Britain and the 
VJestern powers would not support the U.S. in its "attempts to force 
the United Nations to a quick recognition of Mr. Kasavubu as the legiti- 
mate governing authority in the Congo at the expense of Mr.  Lumumba."'-* 
Their reasons for taking this position were not that they thought 
Lumumba would be such a good prime minister for they agreed that he was 
"certainly emotional, unstable and paranoid" but that he seemed to be 
the only person widely enough known and "free enough from sectional 
interest"  to be Prime Minister.711    There was a grave danger of similar 
mistakes being made in Africa as had been made by the West in the Far 
East and in the Middle East resulting at best in "a collection of 
insecure leaders of ineffective small states,   upheld in their positions— 
and only shakily upheld—simply because their opponents had talked to 
the communists."7*    The situation in the Congo and the policy the U.S. 
had hitherto taken made this danger very real.    In March, 1961, it was 
reported by some that the Kasavubu Qovernment was "largely a sham," and 
that except for his own tribal area, his support depended on money 
coming from Belgians and "quiet Americans" which enable Mobutu to 
7;5T. P. M. Creighton, "Congo:    The Need for Compromise," 
The Spectator, CCV (November 18, I960), 768. 
7U- *Ibid. 
230. 
7*"Black Man's Burdon," The Economist, CXCVIII (January 21, 1961), 
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pay regularly the National Security Forces.76 
Not only did the attempts of the U.S. to set up Kasavubu to the 
exclusion of Lumumba perhaps endanger the long-run possibility of 
establishing a stable central government in the Congo, but the seating 
of the Kasavubu delegation was a decision which split the African 
memoers of the UN, a situation which is regarded by many to be most 
unwise for the welfare of Africa and for the United Nations.77 The 
U.S. in pushing such a determined policy of support for Kasavubu and 
opposition to Lumumba offended many African nations and leaders, who 
could not share with the U.S. its Communist phobia, with regard to 
Lumumba who they saw as an African nationalist,  .i  At the same time, 
it gave to the Communists an opportunity for criticism of the UN as 
a Western dominated organization. 
As with other powers, the policies of the U.S. with regard to 
the UN Operation in the Congo were oy no means static. With time and 
the changing of circumstances in the Congo and especially with the 
change of national administration bringing with it a reevaluation and 
revamping of policy, there was the emergence of a more positive role 
in regard to anti-colonialism and the African nations, which was espe- 
cially timely in regard to the Congo situation. In general, President 
Kennedy began to show thtt his policy toward the NATO countries would 
not follow the maxim "love my Nato ally, love his colonial policy.1 
The U.S. began to show a willingness to approach its Western allies 
with a firm policy on Katanga and even, increasingly with time, to 
■78 
76Basil Davidson,  "Facts about the Congo," New Statesman,  LXI 
(March 10, l°6l), 373. 
77"The Blamed Tool," The Economist,  CXCVTl  (November 26,  I960),  865. 
78wopen Line to Moscow," The Economist,   CXCVTII (February 2£, 
1961), 7U8. 
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apply pressure on them in its regard. 
Although for different reasons the U.S., like the African nations, 
began to see that it could not allow the secession of Katanga to con- 
tinue. The secession of one part of the country would serve as a prece- 
dent for the secession of another part and the United States was greatly 
concerned over the possibility of secession around Stanleyville, "leading 
to 'a Central African Cuba.'"'7? Thus, with a determination and a pur- 
suance of its objectives no less than earlier, the U.S. proceeded to 
use its national influence and other means open to it to bring an end 
to the Katanga secession. However, now the U.S. had to its advantage 
the fact that it was pushing in a direction that corresponded with the 
views of the Afro-Asian nations and that future events and circumstances 
seem to call for more and more. 
It was not just, in its views on Katanga that the U.S. showed some 
shift in tone and policy. As interpreted by some there were even hints 
being let out just before Lumumba's death of an "American New Deal for 
the Congo" which included support of an effort to bring all Congolese 
leaders together in a federal union.b0 As compared to the staunch 
attitude previously taken in opposition to Lumumba and in support of 
Kasavubu, these hints were at least indicative of a change of tone and 
perhaps, if not a more flexible, at least a more encompassing and longer 
view of the realities of the Congo situation. Not only did the U.S. 
continue its support of first Dag Hammerskjold and then U Thant in their 
efforts as Secretary-General even at times when they were deserted by all 
"^O'Brien, p. 59. 
80'iQpen Line to Moscow," The Economist, p.  7h7. 
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others, but the support which the U.S.  gave tended to be more in 
accordance with the Secretary-General's conception of the UN role. 
This new U.S. view indicated its having at least a glimpse of the fact 
that the viability of the Congo as a territorial whole supported by all 
elements of the country would be in the long-run Cold War interest of 
the U.S.    Of course,   the threat of a civil war with the Lumumbist- 
Clizengist element backed by the Soviet Union and the Kasavubu element 
by the U.S. was most conducive to the producing of moderation so as to 
avoid this clash.    Whatever the reasons,  far-seeing or immediate, the 
new face of American policy brought it nearer to the views of the Afro- 
Asian nations and put new strength behind the UN Operation in the Congo. 
Although the UN Operation in the Congo brought about many of U.S. 
objectives with regard to to the Congo, the U.S. did continue somewhat 
to supplement this with national action.    What happened in the Congo, 
central to Africa, was of crucial importance to what would happen in the 
whole of Africa in the future.    Thus,  the U.S.,  although seeming to 
have caught a glimpse of the reality that what is productive of a strong, 
viable Congo Government, handmaiden to no one and founded upon a growing 
national loyalty of all its tribal and factional elements, would in the 
long run be best for the U.S. in keeping out Soviet influence; neverthe- 
less, when frightened by immediate circumstances such as the increasingly 
precarious hold of Prime Minister Adoula over his lef-wing extremists and 
the chances of increasing Communist influence, the U.S. often reverted to 
more direct measures to ensure the Congo's Western leaning.    However, the 
effects of such national initiatives as the military mission sent by the 
U.S. to the Congo in late 1962 were not only to give the Soviet Tfraai propa- 
ganda weapons but to cause real concern among other nations of Africa and the world. 
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Although many nations share the U.S. concern with regard to 
Communist agression and some to quite a large extent, yet there is 
often both criticism of and an attempt by some elements to use the 
U.S. extreme sensitivity toward and fear of the spread of Communist 
influence.    Moise Tshombe from the day that he announced Katanga's 
secession tried to use the Communist scare by accusing the Central 
Government of trying to establish a Communist state.    A later oc- 
currence which illustrates the attempts to play to the American ear 
was when Ralph Bunche,  a member of the UN Secretariat, went to talk 
with Tshombe, and Tshombe, knowing that Bunche was an American, hence 
"described at length the Communists on Lumumba's staff."ai    That there 
be any suggestion of such gullibility is not very flattering to the 
American ego.    We can perhaps look at Mr.  Tshombe's display as mere 
farce,   however, of more substance is the following criticism which 
reaches for the heart of the matter: 
Many Americans hasty to find an enemy in Mr.  Gizenga,  still 
speak of  'Lumumbist'  as so many black Khrushchevs.     In fact, 
Mr.  Gizenga's followers attended the session at Leopoldville 
against the advice and predictions of Moscow radio.    The sen- 
sible view of a  'Lumumbist'   is to see him as no more than a 
militant African nationalist—as capable as anyone else of being 
driven into the communist car.p,  but not eager to go. 
Americans seem to fail to realize that the ways of survival and well- 
being for the rest of the world may not be the same as those in the 
United States nor may they be seen in the light of a choice between 
two alternatives—the Russian and the American systems.    Lumumba and 
6lJean Daniel,   "The Drama of Katanga," New Statesman,  LX (August 13, 
I960), 20U. 
82"Humpty Congo," The Economist,  CC (August 12,  1961),  609. 
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his followers, as other African nationalist, asked aid of both the 
United States and Russia and seemed not to be too concerned about where 
the aid came from as long as it came.     The important thing for these 
Congolese nationalists was the Congo's survival as an independent and 
prosperous African nation.    Perhaps Lumumba,  with his eccentric and 
unstable ways, was from the beginning handicapped in his relations 
with the West or the U.N.,  and perhaps he was beginning to play a 
dangerous game with the Communists in seeking their aid "without any 
strings," but wer'.' the policies of the U.S.   as far seeing as they 
might have been,  or were they toe often aimed at trying to get rid of 
what to the U.S. was undesirable, merely to attack rather than prevent? 
V.     THE CONGO AS A  CRISIS TO AFRICA:     THE AFRICAN VIEWPOINT 
Although Africa does not speak with one voice,  the African states 
do share many common concerns and aspirations.     Varying to some degree 
in their outlook and political orientation,   they nevertheless have 
many fundamental similarities causing them to act with unity on prob- 
lems crucial to African interests.    The events in the Congo following 
its independence brought great concern to all African states.     Both 
the problems the Congolese were facing and the attempt of the United 
Nation* to aid in the transition from colon y to independent nation 
were of utmost significance to all Africans.     In a speech to the 
General Assembly, Mongi Slim,  Chairman of the Tunisian Delegation to 
the United Nations and President of the Sixteenth Session of the General 
Assembly,  indicates the significance of the Congo situation to Africa: 
The experience in the Congo has for us a symbolic signi- 
ficance in that it has raised the problem of decoloniza- 
tion in one complete instance and in all its  aspects—adminis- 
trative,  political,  economic, and social .   .  .   t" 
This viewpoint of Africa is further related by the President of the 
Republic of Ghana,  Dr.  Kwame Nkrumah who says: 
The Congo question is a test case for Africa.    What is 
happening in the Congo today may happen in any other part 
of Africa tomorrow, and what the United Nations does today 
must set a prp^edent or a pattern for what it may have to 
do tomorrow.■* 
^'•America Speaks to the UN: A Symposium of Aspirations and 
Concerns voiced by Representative Leaders of the UN," International 
Organization, XVI (Spring,  1962), 315- 
8l*Ibid., p.  317. 
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African leaders saw the problems of the Congo as part of a larger 
picture of the postcolonial problems of Africa.    Thus, they were 
intimately involved with the decisions that were being made and the 
precedents that were being set.    They sought at all costs to prevent 
foreign intervention in the Congo.    It was for this reason that even 
when many of them were dissatisfied—even disillusioned—by the course 
of action of the UN Operation after the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism, they 
nevertheless  gave their support to the General Assembly Resolution to 
prevent unilateral military aid to the Congo while the UN Force was 
there.    As the same time that the African states sought to rid them- 
selves of the colonial vestiges they sought to prevent any part of 
the Continent from becoming an area of big power rivalry.    Their desire 
was to have Africa for the Africans, without any foreign interference. 
This desire entailed not only having the Congo maintain its political 
independence but also for it to attain economic independence. 
For the   Congo to be economically viable it was necessary for it 
to maintain its territorial integrity.    Although as with the rest of 
Africa boundaries had been drawn aroitrarily by colonial rulers without 
regard to  tribal factors,  yet African leaders realize the necessity of 
maintaining these "legal fiction" borders so as to avoid complete 
anarchy and economic ruin.    To admit the possibility of secession, 
such as attempted by Katanga, would set a precedent for the balkani- 
zation of Africa. 
Every African nation,  large or small,   federal or unitary, 
has its Katanga.     Once the logic of secession is admitted, 
there is no end except in anarchy.    And so every African govern- 
ment knows that its first problem is how to hold the country 
together when it is threatened by a wide disintegration.°5 
8fc ■Jailerstein, p.  88. 
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The danger of balkanization is perhaps the greatest problem facing 
Of. 
Africa today. Balkanization is seen by the African states as an 
"instrument of neo-colonialism" in that a nation must be at least 
a certain size if it is to become economically viable.   *    African 
states could not countenance Katanga's secession which endangered 
the Congo's economic independence and encouraged "every divisive 
tendency" in any of the African states. 
The situation in the Congo was a crisis for the African conti- 
nent.    There were many reasons for the great concern shown by the 
African states as to what was going on in the Congo.    Whatever 
happened in this vast country in the heart of African could be influ- 
ential to the futures of other African states.    The political and 
ideological fluidity in Africa only increased the possible impact of 
events and outcome in the Congo.    Should foreign intervention be 
substantial,  then there would be a danger of the spread of foreign 
influence in Africa.    Also,   the steps taken to solve the decoloniza- 
tion problems in other emerging states.    Precedents set in the Congo 
might work for good or ill. 
As  the United Nations moved into the Congo situation this only 
heightened African involvement.    The African states were concerned 
with the results of the United Nations involvement because they 
viewed the Organization as important to their future well-being. 
Also,  the majority of UN troops in the Congo were provided by African 
states and through being on the Advisory Committee to the Secretary- 
86 Peter Duigan and Lewis Gann,  "A Different View of United States 
Policy in Africa," Western Political Quarterly, XII (December, I960),923. 
87 Herskovits, p. 371. 
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General, many of them were most intimately and influentially involved 
with the UN Operation in the Congo. These factors indicate the many 
ways in which the situation in the Congo and the UN efforts to deal 
with it so concerned the other African nations. As noted by the Secre- 
tary-General and as believed by the African nations, in the Congo 
crisis, the future of Africa was at stakej 
To understand the positions taken by the African states in the 
United Nations and their actions with regard to the Congo, one must 
attempt to see the Congo situation from the African viewpoint. 
African nations have looked upon the events occurring in the Congo 
and in the United Nations from the context of the problems which are 
to them most real. The newly independent African nations are faced 
with the difficulty of preserving their political independence and 
attaining economic viability. The danger of secession leading to a 
balkanization of the continent is an ever-present problem. Such 
balkanization would make impossible the attaining of economic in- 
dependence by the nations of Africa and would relegate the continent 
once again to an inferior position in the world. Thus, many of the 
nations of Africa live in fear of attempts of neo-colonialism, while 
faced with internal problems of trying to make into a nations diverse 
populations with little or no national feeling. They are faced with 
the need to make their nations economically viable, yet at present are 
necessarily subject to the dangers accompanying the receiving capital 
and technical aid from the East or West. 
The concerns of the African nations as they see them derive not 
so much from the Cold War as from "colonial experience and post- 
colonial aspirations." They involve not so much a choice between the 
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"free world and the Communist world, democraey and authoritarianism, 
or economic systems of East and West" as a fight against any form 
of imperialism and for the nourishment of their own "cultural unique- 
ness."^ Thus, much of African efforts is as follows: 
It is the effort to gain greater access to the economic 
levers of power—skills, productivity and capital—so 
that the new state will, more and more, be in charge 
of its own destiny. It is the search for the proper re- 
lationship of the new states to their former metropoles, 
to the great powers, and to one another, and the creation 
of a new order in those vast regions recently vacated 
by the imperial powers."9 
Of course, the African nations are very much effected by the 
rivalry of the twc world power blocs. It is a reality of our present 
world that has largely shaped the international scene onto which the 
African states have recently been emerging. As a result of this ri- 
valry, the African states are placed in a unique bargaining position 
with both sides, and their foreign policies are formulated in view of 
this reality.   However, just because African nations are aware of 
and formulate their policies in light of the circumstances of the 
Cold War, this does not mean that they are absorbed by Cold War con- 
cerns. African has problems and aspirations of her own and to most 
of the African nations the concerns of the competing power blocs are 
of importance to them only in so much as they effect their more funda- 
mental African problems. 
The problems which the African nations are facing are viewed 
.lobert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Postcolonial 
Politics," Neutralism and Nonalignment, ed. Lawrence W. Martin (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 38. 
89 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
90Herskovits, pp.  3U2-U3. 
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especially by some of them as calling for more than the grafting of 
one system or anotner from older nation states. They do not want to 
be carbon copies of older states, and the problems which they face 
in this age along with their tribal traditions seem to call for new 
measures even to reach old ends. Thus, in dealing with their problems 
often they do not hesitate to extract what they need from various 
systems of government without necessarily taking all the idealogy 
etc. that comes with it. One noted anthropologist explains: 
The fallacy that tae political structures of self- 
governing Africa would be replicas of their Euro- 
american models, or would take over foreign socialist 
or communist forms whole-cloth, arose from an under- 
estimation of the vitality of aborginal political 
institutions.91 
As the result of this extraction from many systems and of the 
modifying so as to make such forms and ways of doing things fit the 
African situation, the African picture cannot just be looked at through 
the lens of the Cold War. The world is not that easily divided. Even 
when speaking of socialism and nationalism in Africa, one needs to 
speak specifically of African socialism and African nationalism. 
African thinkers emphasize "that African socialism is somehow dis- 
tinctively African, rooted in African tradition, and therefore not 
intrinsically related to socialism anywhere else.?2 Nationalism in 
Africa has also been of a specific nature related to African tradition. 
It has not been as defined by Hans Kohn in Encyclopedia Britannica 
"a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is 
felt to be due to the nation state, but rather has been "movements 
91Ibid. p. 355. 
92Wallerstein, p. 1U8. 
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striving for independence from colonial rule?   Even more striking 
with regard to nationalism in Africa is that it is not placed in 
opposition to supranational unity, at least not ideologically: 
African nationalist feel that in a real sense their 
struggle is an unfinished business and will continue 
to be so until unity is achieved. The objective of 
nationalism was not independence. This was only a 
means ... to their real goal, political equality. 
At one level, independence assures equality in that 
each nation is sovereign and is legally free to pur- 
sue its own national interests. On another level, 
in the international arena, small and poor nations 
are scarcely able to compete on equal terms with 
big powers. Thus, there appears the eld political 
theme:  in unity there is strength.9U 
In Africa, national leaders take the lead in Pan-African movements and 
amongst the people there is no stronghold of national loyalties to 
stand in the way of Pan-Africanism. This suggests that perhaps nations 
coming of age in Africa today are least a little more open to the 
realities of the interdependence of nations than those nations which 
have existed through several centuries in which the nation state has 
been supreme. 
In large part, the African nations supported the United Nations 
at every point in its Operation in the Congo. That the difficulties 
in the Congo be smoothed out by the UN Operation rather than by the 
intervention of any one foreign nation or any bloc of nations was 
important to the future of the Congo and of Africa. Also, that the 
United Nations be successful in this Operation in the Congo in which 
it had become so involved was of staggering importance to the Organi- 
zation, and thus, to the African states which saw the United Nations 
93Herskovits, p. 305. 
9Uwallerstein, p. 106. 
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as most significant to their future.     Since the question for the newly- 
emerging, under-developed states is "not whether external power is going 
to be applied in their internal affairs,  but whose external power is 
going to be applied and to what degree,"95 it was important for the 
UN capabilities to be maintained so that it could be that external power. 
The United Nations has sometimes been thought of as the "missionary 
without a dogma."    In comparison with receiving aid from the West "whose 
technicians were tainted with the stigma of colonialism" or from Russia 
"whose help can only be obtained at a unknown price," the United Nations 
"offers a   third and acceptable choice" for the African states.96 
As a whole,  the African states during the Congo crisis have shown 
much "maturity and good sense"  in their support of the United Nations. 
Even when Khrushchev chose tempting moments to denounce  the Secretary- 
General's activities in the Congo,   he did not receive African support.97 
Some of the African states were for some time dissatisfied with the way 
things were going in the Congo.    They did net approve of the way Lumumba 
and his followers were being treated by UN Forces in the Congo.    Some 
of these states even threatened to withdraw their troops unless Lumumba 
was treated differently.    However, even though many of them regarded 
Lumumba as  the legal Prime Minister and as the nationalist leader, yet 
as a whole the African states were careful not to support such moves 
as Khrushchev's which would hamper, if not make impossible,  future UN 
9^Harlan Cleveland, "The Capacities of the United Nations," The 
United States and the United Nations,  ed. Francis 0. Wilcox and H. 
Field Haviland,  Jr., p.  13U. 
96"The Missionary Without a Dogma,"    New Statesman,  p. 201. 
97"UN Heads and Tails," The Economist, CXCVI (September 10, I960), 
970. 
70 
operations.    Thus,   the African nations which supported Lumumba and his 
followers did all they could to influence the UN Operation just as 
they did with regard to the attempted Katanga secession.    However, 
at the times when they did not get their way,  they wer« wise enough 
to see that by striking out at the UN they would be hurting themselves. 
The majority of the independent African states have 
recognized the United Nations as the only body which 
can help them to solve their continental problems. 
Ever more suspicious of 'neo-colonial' interference 
from both East and West, Nkrumah and Bourguiba in 
particular realize that if the UN fails in the Congo 
it will become virtually impossible for Africa to 
secure the economic and technical help which she so 
profoundlv.needs, without being embroiled in the 
Cold War.98 
In the long run the Afro-Asian viewpoint was very influential in 
determining the natures of the UN Operation in the Congo, especially 
with regard to Katanga.    Although the African states were cautious 
with regard to allowing the UN to set a precedent of violating the 
supreme sovereignty of a state,   they were not nearly so concerned 
about the possibility of the UN effecting the internal situation in 
the Congo when it was with regard to ending Katanga's secession.    Their 
staunch position with regard to the UN's action in Katanga is easily 
understood when seen in context with the dangers threatening Africa. 
So are many of the other positions taken by Africa with regard to the 
Congo and the UN Operation when seen in context with the concerns 
and aspirations primary to the African leaders.    Although sometimes 
agreeing with one or the other, the African nations were not looking 
at the situation in the Congo from the viewpoint of either the West 
or East but rather seeing it as a crisis to Africa.    And,  the greatest 
98Bloomfield,  "New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The United 
States and the United Nations, p. 63. 
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danger to the new African nations, whether because of balkinization, 
neo-colonialism, racial wars,   or lack of capital and technical 
assistance, "is that they will not go forward."99 
99Bloomfield,  "New Diplomacy in the United Nations,"    The United 
States and the United Nations, p. 63. 
VI.     THE UN AS  ILLUMINATED BY THE CONGO CRISIS 
Although it is true, at least in one sense, that the United 
Nations is a mirror of the world around it, yet has not the UN, 
especially with the  Congo crisis, shown itself to be much more than 
a mirror reflecting the world around it?    I would suggest that the 
Congo Operation has marked a significant point in the development of 
the United Nations.    With its Operation in the Congo,  the United Nations 
has more  than ever before, given evidence of its potential as a power. 
The UN does more than just reflect;  it also has a determining influence 
of its own, that although originally derived from the nation states 
yet can continue of itself at least for a short period of time, and 
can piece together partial and inadequate support from many of the 
nations to make a somewhat effective force and policy. 
The situation faced by the  UN Operation in the Congo was in 
reality without precedent in UN experience.    Although there had been 
other peace-keeping operations,   the United Nations Emergency Force 
being especially significant, yet never before had the United Nations 
attempted a task of the size and complication of that in the Congo. 
Also,  the very nature of the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
was unique even from the very beginning in that UN Forces were given 
the responsibility of assisting the Congolese Government even in the 
maintenance of internal law and order.    With time,  the situation in 
the Congo called for more and more unprecedented actions from the 
Security Council, the General Assembly,  and the Sedretary-General. 
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The challenge provided by the Congo crisis and the measures attempted 
by the United Nations in order to deal with it serve to illuminated 
more than ever before both the potential and limits of the Organization 
in our present wcrld. 
The UN assistance to the Congo—both military and civilian opera- 
tions—was an attempt to aid the Congolese with their decolonization 
problems until they could handle them alone.    The UN attempted to in- 
sulate the Congo from foreign intervention while  the Congolese faced 
their problems.     However,   the developing complications within the 
Congo—the schism among the leaders of the Central Government and the 
attempted secessions, especially that of Katanga—endangered the success 
of the UN Operation.     Not only did these internal developments make the 
carrying out of the UN mandates difficult especially in the field it- 
self, but the positions taken by the nations of the world often led 
to deadlock in New York.    With vague directions,   often issued by the 
Security Council when circumstances were quite different in the Congo, 
the Secretary-General had to carry on the UN Operation.    With prac- 
tically all nations  expressing at one time or another their dissatis- 
faction with the UN Operation in the Congo and all too often there being 
widespread discontent and threat of withdrawal of support,  the Secretary- 
General nevertheless carried on.    Had the Secretary-General been restricted 
to mere administrative duties or had his undertakings been subject to 
first reaching agreement with another person,  the Operation would have 
been greatly handicapped,  if net impossible to carry out.    The Congo 
Operation showed the necessity of the executive action of the Secretary- 
General.    In this executive authority of the Secretary-General lay the 
ability of the United Nations to carry on its peace-keeping operations 
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even when nations are at odds or have temporarily withdrawn their 
support. 
Both Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant have shown 
their ability and willingness for executive action.    Dag Hammarskjold 
had so evidenced his capacity for independent planning and execution 
of UN action in the Middle East and then in the Congo,   that Russia began 
to realize the inherent danger that lay in the UN's having an office of 
such power free from their national veto.    The UN action in the Congo 
which as early as September,   I960,  had showed itself contrary to 
Russian desires and policies, was enough to set into motion all  the 
resentment and anger which had been building up among Russian leaders 
as they watched the "independent'1 power of the Secretary-General grow. 100 
Thus, at the same time that the Congo crisis revealed the necessity of 
the executive authority of the Secretary-General for carrying on peace- 
keeping operations by a UN force, it "supplied the requisite drsma as 
well as the conclusive reason" for Soviet onslaught on Secretary- 
General Dag Hammarskjold and the office of Secretary-General.1Q1    The 
Soviet Union has shown its opposition to the UN Operation in the Congo 
and tc the general development of the UN's ability to take action at 
times free from Soviet veto in many ways including with-holding its 
financial support 01   the Operations.    Yet none of her attempts have 
struck any more fundamentally at UN capacity to act in the present world 
than her attempt to change the nature of the office of the Secretary- 
General.    Had Russia's "troika"  principle been carried through,   it would 
100Bloomfield,   "The New Diplomacy in the United Nations," The 
United States and the United Nations,   p.  67. 
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have dealt a death blow to the carrying out of any future UN peace- 
keeping operations.  It would have confined the United .Nations to being 
little more than an international forum with no capacity to act. 
As with the office of the Secretary-General in specific, the Congo 
crisis has shown the potential and the limitation or dangers to the 
United Nations peace forces.  In attempting to meet the challenge of 
the Congo crisis, the UN placed itself under a spotlight. What was 
its capacity to act in such a situation? Could it gather enough troops 
with enough speed so as to penetrate the vast ares of the Congo before 
it became subject to other foreign intervention and embroiled in world 
issues? Could the troops taken from different nations, speaking dif- 
ferent languages and having different customs, be supplied and maintained? 
Could they work together effectively and uphold the principles of a 
peace-keeping force? The questions—both theoretical and practical— 
to be asked with regard to the setting up and maintaining of a peace 
force by an international organization are innumerable. The Congo 
Operation has been somewhat of a test case with regard to the United 
Nations capacity. Scholars, as well as persons involved directly with 
UN operations, have studied the UN experience in the Congo to determine 
what can be done to meet other and future needs of the world. Some 
persons are even investigating the possibility of a permanent UN Peace 
Force which would remove some of the difficulties of getting contingents 
in a hurry when launching an operation. However, whether thinking in 
terms of the possible problems facing a permanent force or thinking of 
how to be more effective in meeting the next emergency which requires 
a UN force, scholars and planners have turned to the UN Operation in 
the Congo for information and answers. 
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The UN Congo Operation has provided invaluable experience. 
It has shown some of the great difficulties facing an international 
organization dependent on its member states even for provision of its 
continents.    The Secretary-General was all too often under the threa: of 
nations withdrawing their contb^ents because  they disagreed with UN 
directives.    On the personal level,  there was the difficulty of having 
men carrying out under UN orders actions which were contrary to their 
national policies when it would be to  their own nations that they wruld 
return after a short period of service with the UN Force.    Although 
there proved to be innumerable difficulties in the carrying out by 
an international organization an operation such as the Congo in a world 
still characterized by national sovereignty, yet the UN Operation 
demonstrated somewhat its real possibilities even in our world today. 
As a whole,  the men who served in the UN Force in the very difficult 
situation in the Congo were able to live up to the ideals of the peace- 
keeping mission.     Not only were they able to make a satisfactory dis- 
tinction between their national loyalties and their duty as impartial 
UN contigents,  they were also able to maintain the necessary self- 
restraint to often take the condemnation of a people they were trying 
to help and sometimes see their fellow-members killed without taking 
revenge. 
I will not attempt within the confines of this paper to present 
the many arguments with regard to the need, the possibility, or the 
practicality of a permanent peace force. However, a study of the UN 
Operation in the Congo must lead one to the deliberation of such a 
possibility. One thinks of the needs of the present world, and the 
possibility and practicality of a permanent force coming into being 
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within the structure of the United Nations. To present some of my 
own views and sentiments I quote from a recent speech of Secretary- 
General U Thant: 
In my opinion, a permanent United Nations force is not 
a practical proposition at the present time .... 
Personally, I have no doubt that the world should even- 
tually have an international police force which will be ac- 
cepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same 
way as national police forces are accepted. .Meanwhile, we 
• must be sure that developments are in the right direction and 
that we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur. 
There are a number of reasons why it seems to me that 
the establishment of a permanent United Nations force would 
be premature at the present time. I doubt whether many Govern- 
ments in the world would yet be prepared to accept the poli- 
tical implications of such an institution and, in the light 
of our current experience with financial problems, I am sure 
that they would have very serious difficulties in accepting 
the financial implications. 
I believe that we need a number of parallel developments 
before we can evolve such an institution. We have to go fur- 
ther along the road of codification and acceptance of a work- 
able body of international law. We have to develop a more 
sophisticated public opinion in the world, which can accept 
the transition from predominately national thinking to inter- 
national thinking. 
We shall have to develop a deeper faith in international 
institutions as such, and a greater confidence in the possi- 
bility of a United Nations civil service whose international 
loyalty and objectivity are generally accepted and above 
suspicicn. We shall hsve to improve the method of financing 
international organization. Until these conditions are met, 
a permanent United Nations for may not be a practical prop- 
osition. 102 
It is with this look into the future, attempting to "be sure that 
developments are in the right direction" that I conclude this present 
investigation of the international ramifications of the Congo crisis. 
Until we have some of these parallel developments there will be other 
emergencies such as that in the Congo that will have to be met using 
what is now available. The UN Operation in the Congo has encountered 
102Secretary-General U Thant, "United Nations Stand-By Peace Force," 
United Nations Review. X (July, 1963), 56. 
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many problems and set many precedents.    '£m ability to learn from 
this experience in the Congo and the choice of precedents set there- 
in will do much to determine the role which the United Nations will 
play in meeting the needs of the world in the future. 
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APPENDIX I 
ilution S/U7U1 adopted  by the Security Council on  February 21,  1961) 
A. 
The Security Council, 
Having considered the situation in the Congo, 
Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the 
the Congolese leaders, Mr.  Patrice Lumumba, Mr.  Maurice 
Mpolo and Mr.   Joseph Okito, 
Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these 
crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and blood- 
shed in the Congo and the threat to international peace 
and security, 
Noting the report of the Secretary-General's Special 
Representative  (S/U691)  dated February 12th, 196l, bringing 
to light the development of a serious civil war situation 
and preparations  therefore 
1. Urges that the United Nations   cake immediately all 
appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil 
war in the Congo,  including arrangements for cease-fires, 
the halting of all military operations,  the prevention of 
clashes and the use of force,  if necessary,  in the last 
resort; 
2. Urges that measure be taken for the immediate with- 
drawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and 
other foreign military and para-military personnel and 
political advisers not under United Nations command,  and 
mercenaries; 
3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic 
measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the 
Congo from their territories and for the denial of transit 
and other facilities to them; 
U.    Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation 
be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of  the death 
of Mr.   LumumDa and his colleagues and that the perpetrators 
of these crimes be punished; 
5.    Reaffirms the Security Council resolutions of July lhth, 
July 22nd and August 9th,  i960,  and the General Assembly 
resolution lU7h  (ES-IV)  of September 20th, I960,  and reminds 
all States of their obligation under these resolutions. 
B. 
The Security Council, 
Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the 
Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously 
imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial 
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integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace 
and security. 
Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic 
viola cions of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
general absence of rule of law in the Congo. 
Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration 
of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance 
with the fundamental law of the country, so that the will 
of the people should be reflected through the freely elected 
parliament, 
Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo 
lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without 
any interference from outside and tnat there can be no solu- 
tion without conciliation, 
Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, 
including the formation of any Government not based on 
genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues 
greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo 
and threat to international peace and security; 
1. Urges the convening of the parliament and the taking 
of necessary protective measures in that connectionj 
2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel 
should be recognised and brought under discipline and control, 
and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases 
to that end and with a view to the elimination of any 
possibility of interference by such units and personnel in 
the political life of the Congo: 
3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-oper- 
ation and assistance and take such measures as may be 
necessary on their part, for the implementation of this 
resolution. 
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APPENDIX II 
(Resolution S/5002 adopted by the Security Council on November 2h, 1961) 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions S/U387, S/UUO?, S/W*26 and 
s/hinr, 
Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1U7U 
(ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV), 
Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United 
Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set 
out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely: 
(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the 
political independence of the Republic of the Congo; 
(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo 
in the restoration and maintenance of law and order; 
(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the 
Congo; 
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation 
from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and 
advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, 
and all mercenaries; and 
(e) To render technical assistance, 
Welcoming the restoration of the national of the Congo 
in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent 
formation of a Central Government on August 2nd, 1961, 
Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority 
of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically 
secessionist activities and armed action now being carried 
on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the 
aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and 
completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign 
independent nation', 
Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of 
violence against United Nations personnel, 
Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo 
as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external 
affairs of the Congo, 
3earing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and 
effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes 
of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate 
plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the in- 
terests of world peace and international co-operation, and 
stability and progress of Africa as a whole. 
la Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities 
illegally carried out by the provincial administration of 
Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by 
foreign mercenaries; 
2. Further deprecates the armed action against United 
Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activi- 
ties; 
3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, 
and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom; 
U. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous 
action, includin the use of requisite measure of force, 
if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention 
pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign 
military and para-military personnel and political advisers 
not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as 
laid down in paragraph A. 2 of the Security Council reso- 
lution of February 21st, 1961. 
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all 
necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such 
elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment 
or other material in support of such activities; 
6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of 
arras, equipment or other material which could be used for 
warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to pre- 
v nt their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny 
transportation and transit facilities for such supplies 
across tneir territories, except in accordance with the 
decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations; 
7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from pro- 
moting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission 
or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities 
against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostil- 
ities against the United Nations forces and personnel; 
5. Declares that all secessionist activities against 
the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fonda- 
■nentale and Security Council decisions and specifically 
demands that such activities which are now taking place 
in Katanga shall cease forthwith; 
9. Declares full and firm support for the Central 
Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist 
that Government in accordance with the decisions of the 
United Nations to maintain law and o.'der and national in- 
tegrity, to provide technical assistance ana to implement 
those decisions; 
10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, 
according to their national procedures, to bhe Central 
Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity 
with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations; 
11. ..equests all Member States to refrain from any action 
which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and 
purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary 
to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter. 
33. 
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